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SHOP TALK: CONVERSATIONS
ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF OUR LABOUR LAW
By

DAVID

M.

BEATTY*

In this essay Professor Beatty joins the debate as to how, if at all, the
Charter ofRights and Freedoms and the process of judicial review can be
integrated with our tradition of democratic rule and the sovereignty of
the popular will. Rather than deal directly with the arguments of those
who are critical of the entrenchment of a written bill of rights, Professor
Beatty endeavors to cast the Charter and the new role of the judges in
the best possible light. Analogizing the process of constitutional review
to "conversations of justification" (using examples drawn from the labour
law field), Professor Beatty describes how the Charter offers those who
are generally financially weak, numerically small and otherwise politically
disadvantaged an opportunity to participate in the formulation of social
policies which profoundly affect their lives in a way majoritarian politics
have never allowed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Five years have now passed since the entrenchment of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 in the Canadian
Constitution. The controversy and debate which surrounded its
formulation and infusion into our system of government still
endures. In the media, in our legislatures, in the courts and
especially in our law schools much ink has been spilled (or bites
taken) and many conversations have been spent exploring the
meaning of that event. Seemingly, neither the reasoning of the
courts nor the arguments of the analysts have been able to deliver
a decisive argument one way or the other.
Broadly speaking, there are in this, as in every debate, two
points of view. There are the critics and there are the supporters
of the Charter, and of the system of judicial review which it entails.
The critics, or the sceptics as they are sometimes called, think that
empowering our courts to review the decisions of our lawmakers
against the rights and freedoms the Charter guarantees was a
mistake for two reasons. First, they say such an alteration in our
system of government distorts and is inconsistent with our
democratic tradition of popular sovereignty. This is an argument
about the legitimacy of our third branch of government exercising
the authority that is implicit in a process of constitutional review.
In addition, the critics say that even if legitimate, our courts are
institutionally ill suited and poorly designed to perform the functions
that constitutional review entails. The judicial process, it is said,
works best and is structured to deal with concrete disputes between
two parties and to develop a true picture of a specific event 2. In
their view it is simply not equipped to handle the broad inquiries
1 Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 P. Weiler, In The Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, 1974) at 170.
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into the integrity of major pieces of social policy that are
unavoidably at the centre of constitutional review.
Each of these concerns raises valid and important issues and
warrants a response from those who take a more sanguine
interpretation of the entrenchment of the Charter and the
possibilities of judicial review. In this essay I want to focus my
attention on the first claim the critics of judicial review advance; on
the very possibility, viz. the legitimacy, of the courts being given the
power to review the constitutional validity of rules and policies our
lawmakers have enacted into, or declared to be, the law. Clearly this
is the more fundamental of the two lines of argument because,
unlike the second, if it carries the day there is no way, short of
starting all over, that the damage can be repaired.
Defenders of judicial review might respond to the legitimacy
argument in a variety of ways. On the one hand, one could try to
identify some flaw in the critique on its own terms. One could try
to show that the understanding the critics have of judicial review is
in some way incoherent or internally inconsistent and so unable to
sustain the position it seeks to prove. Alternatively one might, by
examining the jurisprudence, show how the practice of judicial
review, as young and as spotted as it has been, tends to confirm the
theoretical possibility that it can be integrated with, and further the
ends of, our liberal democratic tradition of government. Still another,
and perhaps the most direct, way for defenders of the Charter to
react is to describe as clearly and forcefully as they can the basis on
which and the ways in which judicial review can enhance the liberal
democratic quality of our (governmental) structures of state.
In this essay, I intend to limit myself to this third approach.
My objective is to make the positive case for the Charter and
judicial review as powerfully as I can. 3 In a separate essay, I have
endeavoured to deal more directly with the critic's arguments which

I have employed the same strategy more fully in D.M. Beatty, Putting the Charter to

Work. Designing a Constitutional Labour Code (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press,
1987).

This essay is organized around and reproduces large segments from the book.

Because my concern is to work through the implications of the interpretation of the Charter
which I think shows it in its best light, I will not analyze various judgments that several lower
courts have written on some of the issues - such as mandatory retirement or workers'

compensation - that are discussed in the text, except to note them in passing.
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purport to deny the theoretical legitimacy of judicial review.4 By
examining the decisions in which the Supreme Court of Canada
refused to extend constitutional protection to workers' freedom to
bargain collectively, to picket and to engage in strikes, decisions
which the critics believe prove their case as clearly as it can, I have
tried to show the critic's position is vulnerable even on its own
terms. Eventually I hope to canvass all of the major judgments of
the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with the Charterto determine
the extent to which the practice of constitutional review actually has
promoted the ultimate objectives which underlie our liberal
democratic system of government.
Let me begin then, to make what I think, both normatively
as well as a positive description of our constitutional law, is the
strongest claim that can be made in support of the Charter and the
process of judicial review. My objective will be to establish that
judicial review is not only consistent with but indeed furthers the
democratic quality of our method of government. I want to show
how on April 15, 1982, when the Charter of Rights was entrenched
in our constitution, a new process of citizen participation in our
system of government was made available to individuals who feel
aggrieved by decisions defended in the name of popular sovereignty.
Any time a country incorporates a written bill of human
rights and freedoms into its constitutional rules of government, the
time-honoured prerogative of Parliament to be wrong, simply
because it expresses the will of the people - or, in theory, at least
a majority of them - is substantially (though not absolutely)
qualified.s With the entrenchment of the Charter, those who feel
adversely affected by decisions taken in the name of majority rule
are empowered to activate a debate of legitimation in which the
ethical (constitutional) integrity of the majority's decision has to be
explained and justified in a particular way. Rather than being
rebuffed with a simple quantitative claim of numerical superiority
D. Beatty & S. Kennett, "Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest and Political
Participation in the Free and Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. at 573.

5 A point Chief Justice Dickson recognized in a lecture given to the Faculty of Law at
the University of Calgary. B. Dickson, "The Democratic Character of the Charter of Rights"
in F.L Morton, ed., Law, Politics and the JudicialProcess in Canada (Canada: University of

Calgary Press, 1984) 325 at 326.
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from the majority who supported the policy at hand, those who feel
they have been discriminated against can insist that some qualitative,
ethical, justification be advanced for the decision as well.
With the entrenchment of the Charter, the process of
validation through which any social policy must pass before it
acquires the authority of law is extended in this important respect.
Now, after preferences have been polled in our legislative
assemblies, a kind of "conversation of justification" must occur
between the winners and losers of the declared law. Far from
undermining the democratic character of our system of government,
constitutional review offers the potential for even more meaningful
citizen participation in the formulation of the rules which most
directly control how they will experience their lives. Those who feel
unfairly burdened by a particular law have the right to be told how
the will of the majority conforms to our constitutional values, and if
it does not, to have the law altered in an appropriate way.
The court's role in these conversations is, first, to structure
and organize the presentation of the debate and secondly, if no
other resolution is possible, to rule on the strength of the arguments
presented. In this latter role, when it issues a judgment about the
constitutional validity of any particular law or social policy, its
function can be likened to a social critic who evaluates the ethical
integrity of some law, or custom or practice of a community6. After
listening to the arguments, pro and con, as to whether a particular
rule or law furthers or flies in the face of the values which lie at the
core of the Charter and our (liberal democratic) theory of social
organization, the third branch of government issues a judgment
about the moral 7 quality of a proposed course of action some agent
or branch of government proposes to pursue.
In theory, this opportunity to participate in the processes by
which social policy is translated into law should be especially
attractive to those individuals who traditionally have had little
6 The metaphor of social critic is borrowed from M. Walzer, Interpretation and Social
Criticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
7 In the final analysis, because s. 33 of the Charterprovides a mechanism with which a

legislature or its executive can override or opt out of most of the constraints the Charter
imposes, any judgment a court issues will bind only in virtue of the moral, not the legal,
force of its reasoning.
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influence in the other two branches of government.8 Because courts
are less vulnerable than the other two branches of government to
the influence of wealth and other pressures that powerful lobbies
can exert, in theory the courts offer those who are financially weak,
numerically small, or otherwise disadvantaged politically, perhaps
their most effective opportunity to participate in the law-making
processes of our communities. Because, in theory, neutral principles
and reason are the only criteria against which decisions should be
made by the courts, 9 those who are economically and otherwise
politically disadvantaged should secure a fairer hearing here than
they do in the less accessible and less visible back rooms of politics.
Neutral principles and reason are more evenly distributed than are
the financial and the other personal resources which are the
effective currency in the processes and institutions of politics.
This depiction of the third branch of our government, as
being a forum for reasoned discourse, free from the imperfections
and impurities of politics is, by admission, an idealized one. As I
said at the outset, my purpose here is to make the best case I can
for the interpretation I favour of the Charter and judicial review.
Having sketched, in the most general terms, the description of the
Charter and the process of judicial review that I think is most
appealing and most congenial with our political tradition of liberal
democracy, I will endeavour, in the remainder of this essay to show
how this vision can be put into practice. In Part II of the essay I
will identify two principles of constitutional interpretation which,
both as a matter of political theory and jurisprudential fact, lie at
the heart of our Charterof Rights. My intention here is to identify
those principles of judicial review which should enjoy the widest, if
not universal support, of all individuals, acting rationally, so that the

8 This is a point P. Russell made in his essay "The Effect of the Charter of Rights on
the Policy-Making Role of Canadian Courts" in F.L. Morton, ed., Law, Politicsand thetJudicial
Process in Canada, supra, note 5 at 293.
9 For a very useful cataloguing and review of the arguments that have been advanced

in the United States on whether such neutral, objective principles exist and if they do, what
their content is, see P. Brest, "The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradictions of Normative Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1063.
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credibility of the conclusions they yield will be as secure as they can
10
possibly be.
In Part III, I will apply these principles to three different
rules in the law we use to regulate relations of people at work
which have already been challenged as violating the Charter. In a
society which has only rarely elected a political party formally allied
with and committed to the interests of workers, labour laws provide
an especially salient opportunity to test the hypothesis that the
courts can enhance the democratic quality of our system of
government in the way I have described. If workers as a group, and
especially those who are least well off, can make use of the courts
to encourage our legislators and their delegates to treat them with
more concern and respect, that will provide powerful confirmation
of the ability of the courts to enhance the democratic quality of our
government.
Following along conversations about the
constitutionality of: (i) excluding farmworkers from our collective
bargaining laws; (ii) requiring people to leave the workplace because
they turn 65 years of age and (iii) denying workers, as a class, the
opportunity to sue their employers in tort when the latter have done
them wrong, will provide us with real-life examples to test the
principles of judicial review developed in Part II and to assess the
integrity of the conversational metaphor.
In the fourth section of the essay, I will outline the
beginnings of a conversation about the constitutional validity of the
principle of exclusive representation which is one of the
cornerstones of our system of collective bargaining. Using the same
principles of interpretation that we applied in the preceding cases,
we will follow the challenge of unskilled and unorganized workers
who can claim that there are (particularly in Western Europe)
alternate principles through which the interests of workers can be
represented collectively, which will better able them to participate
democratically in the decision-making processes of their enterprises.
Their example, perhaps more than any other, best illustrates how
empowering constitutional conversations can be and ultimately how
10 T. Scanlon has formulated a similar standard of moral reasoning as requiring us "to
be able to justify [our] actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject." See
T.M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism" in A. Sen & B. Williams eds, Utilitarianism
and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 103 at 116.
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much more democratic the courts can encourage our community to
be.
II. TWO PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
In this section then, I want to introduce two principles of
constitutional interpretation. One relates to the ends for which any
piece of social policy might be formulated and enacted into or
declared to be law. The other focuses on the particular means, the
details of the particular policy instrument, the lawmaker has chosen
to translate his or her policy objectives into law. With respect to
the former, I want to offer, as a first principle, the admittedly very
general proposition that in guaranteeing all of the specific rights and
freedoms enumerated in its text, the Charter can be understood as
protecting a set of civil liberties or human rights, which are at the
core of individual freedom and dignity, from being compromised by
any arm or agency of government. More broadly stated, we can say
that, like all of the major declarations and covenants of human
rights and freedoms, our Charter is intended to ensure that even
when - or more properly especially when - any group of persons
gains control of any part of the governmental process, they must
respect some (and to that extent equal) authority in every person to
participate in and ultimately maintain some control over the various
decision-making processes through which his or her life is ultimately
governed.
Another way of expressing this basic ideal which infuses the
Charter is to say that its entrenchment commits our law makers to
recognize and respect each person in our society as a rational,
sentient being with a capability for and interest in accomplishing a
set of plans and purposes in his or her life which he or she has
chosen for himself or herself. For example, it demands that in
constructing the institutions within which (for example collective
bargaining) and formulating the rules according to which (for
example mandatory retirement) each person must pursue his or her
own preferences with respect to said employment, society will
respect this basic equality in our personhood. In the co-ordination
and reconciliation of the competing ambitions of each individual in
the society, the Charter requires our legislatures to respect some
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basic equality in a person's right to self-government; to what I will
call equality of personhood for short.
Now I can't imagine that the principle of equality of
personhood (or equality of liberty as it might also be called), will be
problematic for anyone who has joined in the debate about the
integrity of constitutional review. Certainly as a matter of positive
law it was recognized immediately and planted firmly in our
constitutional jurisprudence. Within the Charter's over arching
objective, the creation of a society which is both democratic and
free,1 1 the Supreme Court and various provincial Courts of Appeal
have recognized that it is essential that "all persons should be
treated by the law on a footing of equality, with equal concern and
respect, to ensure each individual the greatest opportunity for his or
her enhancement. 12 As the Supreme Court of Canada put it in
one of its earliest judgments:
A free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the fundamental

freedoms. Freedom must surely be founded
in respect for the inherent dignity and
13
inviolable rights of the human person.

As a matter of political theory the principle is certainly
consistent with - indeed it would seem to be a pre-condition of our liberal democratic tradition of government. Even the most
committed democrats would be constrained to acknowledge the
validity - the neutrality - of this principle. All citizens of a
community must enjoy some (and therefore equal) measure of
independence, some equal opportunity and authority to make
choices for themselves, if the community's claim to be democratic is
not to be a complete sham. To say our institutions and processes
of government are democratic presupposes a degree of freedom and
autonomy on the part of all of the individuals whose lives will be
substantially controlled by the coercive authority of the State.

11

Regina v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (SCC) [hereinafter Oakes].

12 Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 728, 54 O.R. (2d)

513 at 529 (C.A.).
13 Regina v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 359
[hereinafter Big M Drug Mart].
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In addition, the text of the Charterstrongly suggests that its
drafters understood that the principle of equal personhood was at
the core of our constitution and system of government. A close
reading of its initial sections reveals that two different techniques
have been employed by the drafters to realize this deep
constitutional norm. First, the Charterguarantees a certain degree
of physical and intellectual independence which is taken to be a
condition precedent to an individual's being autonomous and in
control of his or her own development. It marks off a space in
each person's life which is free from the intrusions of others and in
which the individual may determine for himself or herself the most
basic aspects of his or her separate existence. Thus, in its guarantee
of the integrity of our physical persons against unreasonable search
and seizure (section 8), arbitrary arrest and detention (subsections
9-11), cruel and unusual treatment (section 12) and the associated
legal rights to counsel (section 11), to interpreters (section 14) and
against self-incrimination (section 13), we see the Charter protecting
the conditions of human freedom which have the deepest roots in
our legal system. Simultaneously, in guaranteeing (in section 2) the
fundamental freedoms of conscience and religion, of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, of assembly and of association, the Charter
protects the corresponding intellectual independence which is
understood as being equally essential to and a pre-condition of
individual autonomy and self-control.1 4 These rights, to our physical
and intellectual independence, along with those guaranteeing a
degree of mobility and linguistic autonomy, mark off an area of
personal responsibility and integrity in which each of us is entitled
to be equally (but not absolutely) free from the interference of
others.
The Charter's commitment to the ethical ideal of equality of
personhood is not, however, a concept which is exclusively negative
or anti-social in character. It has a positive, social dimension to it

14 For a prudential account of why conditions of freedom and material well-being are
prerequisites for human agency and autonomy, see A. Gewirth, 'The Basis and Content of
Human Rights" in Human Rights: Essayson JustificationsandApplications(Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1982) 41. See also L.H. Tribe, American Constitution Law (Mineola:
Foundation Press, 1978) at 573ff1and R.M. Smith, "The Constitution and Autonomy" (1982)
60 Tex. L.Rev 175.
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as well. In addition to requiring our legislators to respect a private
sphere, within which all individuals may govern and choose for
themselves, free from the interference of others, the Charter also
extends its commitment to equality to the public arena as well.
Thus the democratic rights which are set out in sections 3-5 and the
equality rights which are provided in section 15 together guarantee
that each person has a right to participate as an equal in and be
treated as an equal by the legislative processes in which the
community collectively settles the rules which govern its affairs.
Where conditions of conflict and scarcity prevail, where our
ambitions as individuals collide, and must therefore be reconciled by
rules jointly and publicly determined, the Charter's guarantee of our
democratic rights and equality rights ensures that each person can
participate to some minimum (and therefore equal) degree (to vote,
stand for office, etc.) in the formulation of those rules and will
benefit from and be protected by their equal application. It
guarantees the integrity of the democratic process itself.
To summarize then, the principle of equality of personhood
that is guaranteed collectively in the rights and freedoms specified
in the Charter might be characterized as our first principle of social
justice. "Ordered liberty," as it has sometimes been described15 is,
in a sense, our most basic political ideal. With respect to those
conditions our society regards as essential to being able to choose a
lifestyle for oneself (independence of thought and physical
inviolability of the person), each individual is guaranteed equal
protection against social interference. 16 And, in the processes and
institutions which settle the rules of social co-operation to which
everyone's life plans and ambitions must conform, the principle
insists on a further dimension of the equality that holds between us.
Together the political, civil, legal and equality rights entrenched in
our Charter commit our legislatures to and constrain them by what
Ronald Dworkin has called a "general requirement of justice." As
defined by him, such a requirement entails that,

15 The phrase has been used by the American Supreme Court on a number of occasions.
See, for example, Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (Blackman J.), Palko v. Connecticut 302
US 319 at 325 (1937) (Cardozo J.).
16 See A. Gewirth, supra, note 14.
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government must treat its citizens as equals, as equally entitled to concern and
respect. Of course this general requirement is very abstract ...
But we can
nevertheless speak of a general duty of government to treat its citizens this way, and
derive from this two distinct and more concrete responsibilities. The first is the
responsibility, in creating a political order, to respect whatever underlying moral and
political rights citizens may have in the name of genuine equality. The second is
the obligation to extend17 whatever political order it does create equally and
consistently to everyone.

While the characterization of our system of social relations
as one based on some conception of ordered liberty may not seem
to be a particularly bold or insightful observation this should not
tempt one to depreciate its significance. It is important to see that,
as part of a larger political theory, the principle I am calling equality
of personhood can organize, what Charles Fried has described as,
"an elaborate structure of arguments and considerations which
descend from on high but stop some twenty feet above the
ground."18 Equality of personhood can and should guide a court in
its assessment of the constitutional integrity of any legislative
enactment it might be asked to review. It can provide a larger
focus, a richer understanding within which the Charter can be
interpreted and applied.
Moreover, as a principle of interpretation, it clearly does
identify at least one ground on which a legislature could begin to
defend any challenge to its constitutional authority to "Act" under
section 1 of the Charter. Promoting the (equal) freedom of some
(and especially the least advantaged) people in the community is, if
anything is, a constitutionally valid purpose on which social
regulation, including labour legislation, can be defended. There has
never been any doubt that considerations of justice - as opposed,
say, to utility - can justify limitations on the rights and freedoms set
1 9 It simply
out in the Charter.
could not be otherwise. Rights and
freedoms collide. When my employer terminates me from my

17 R. Dworkin, "Natural Law Revisited" (1982) Univ. of Fla. L. Rev. 165 at 185.
18 C. Fried, "Artificial Reason of the Law Or. What Lawyers Know" (1981) 60 Tex. L.
Rev. 35 at 57.
19 For an argument that it is only when Government violates this constitutional norm
of moral autonomy that departures from the equality guarantees cannot be justified under s.
1, see A. Brudner, "What are Reasonable Limits to Equality Rights?" (1986) 64 Can. Bar Rev.
469.
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employment because I have reached 65 years of age, its freedom
(not) to associate (by contract) with whomever it chooses can be
seen to conflict, unavoidably, with my right not to have decisions
made about my life simply because of my age (or sex etc.) and one
of our entitlements - or maybe both - will, to some extent, have to
give way. Such collisions between competing rights are at the heart
of the controversy over human rights legislation and union security
laws. Indeed defenders of minimum wage, health and safety and
employment standards legislation also commonly point to the
economic liberty of those they purport to protect as legitimizing
some interference with the freedom of those they inevitably
20
constrain.
But as important as this principle is to understanding our
new system of constitutional order, it is true that, by itself, it doesn't
tell us enough. We need to know more than what that principle
says before we can carry our analysis any further. Integrity of
purpose is not sufficient by itself to justify encroachments or
limitations under section 1. Even when it is pursuing objectives
which are most in keeping with our new constitutional criteria, there
are limits as to how far a legislature may go. Purity of purpose is
not always sufficient to exculpate us from liability when, acting as
individuals, we carelessly interfere with the rights and freedoms the personal integrity and autonomy of others - and it can not be
otherwise when, acting collectively, we do the same. Legislative
means, as well as ends, must conform to some external, objective,
standards of constitutional review. If the principle of equality of
liberty will be of assistance in telling us when a legislature might
initiate legislation which constrains the liberty of some members of
the community, we now need something to tell us when our
lawmakers must stop.
Adhering to a strategy of caution, I propose to introduce a
second principle of judicial review, which is expected to be as
uncontroversial as the first. This principle is one I shall call the
doctrine of the reasonable alternative, although it might also be
described as the maximization principle. Simply stated, it would

20 Conversations about the constitutional validity of these aspects of our labour laws
are set out in D.M. Beatty, supra, note 3.
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stipulate that if. there were several ways of accomplishing a valid
social objective, one of which invaded our constitutional rights less
than the others, that alternative would have to be chosen by the
legislature to realize its purposes. The principle would require that
if one method or means existed which, all other things being equal,
could achieve a set of social objectives which were themselves
constitutionally valid, by respecting and doing less violence to our
rights and freedoms, that method would have to be selected. In the
face of such an alternative the limitations and exceptions to our
constitutional commitments that would be caused by all of the other
means of social regulation could not be "demonstrably justified" in
a society which considered itself both "democratic and free".
My expectation is that this second principle of judicial review
will not be any more controversial or troublesome for those who
must interpret the Charter than the first principle. Especially when
we are considering legislation which seems to prejudice those who
are already seriously disadvantaged, if we refused to hold our
legislatures to this principle, if rights could be violated unnecessarily,
the Charter wouldn't be worth very much. The constitutional
commitment to our equal right to control our own development
would be drained of all meaning if our rights and freedoms, our
equality of liberty, could be sacrificed for no rational reason.
The principle is in fact simply one variation (and one of the
mildest) of what has come to be called the proportionality principle.
That latter principle, in its widest formulation, holds that any
restriction on our constitutional entitlements must be proportionate
to the public interest that is served thereby. The more serious the
limitation or invasion of a right or freedom, the more compelling the
justification must be. The principle of the reasonable alternative is
simply a narrower (and, I trust, even less controversial) rendition
which stipulates that a limitation cannot be justified under section 1
if it can be shown that less stringent measures are available to
accomplish the social purpose at hand. Both are examples of the
criterion of reasonableness to which governmental restrictions on
rights and freedoms must now conform.
Both the narrower and wider versions of the principle have
already received some recognition by our courts as well as by those
in other communities which have had considerable experience in
identifying when and explaining how limits on constitutional rights
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and freedoms can be justified in a society which claims to be free
and democratic. Both before and after the entrenchment of our
Charter of Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada has invoked the
principle to assess the constitutional validity of laws they had been
asked to review.2 1
The European Commission and Court of
Human Rights as well as the United States Supreme Court have
also invoked what is substantially the same principle in testing the
validity of departures and deviations from the rights and freedoms
set out in the European Convention of Human Rights and
Freedoms and the American Bill of Rights. In the case of the latter,
it is a fixed principle of American constitutional law that "strict
scrutiny" (which includes but is not exhausted by the principle of
reasonable alternatives), will be given to any governmental initiative
infringing on certain of the specific rights, such as freedom of
speech and assembly, which are explicitly set out in the American
Constitution.2 2
And, in a parallel fashion the European Court,
interpreting language which, in this regard, substantially parallels the
words we have used in section 1 (if anything, the language is even
weaker than what is in our Charter), has consistently applied both
the broader proportionality principle and its derivative of least
23
drastic means.

21 Oakes, supra, note 11.

See also Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 13. Even before the

adoption of our earlier, statutory Bill of Rights, legal scholars and political scientists had
identified what they characterized as an "interpretive avoidance" methodology by which courts
chose from among a number of possible interpretations of a legislative enactment the one
which most respected our traditional rights and freedoms recognized at common law. So
described, as a technique of interpretation, "interpretive avoidance" is simply the principle I
have called reasonable alternatives or less drastic means, by another name. See supra, note
5 at 262. See also MacKay v. The Queen, [19801 2 S.C.R. 370 at 406-07, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 393
at (McIntyre 3).
22 See F.D. Wormuth & H.G. Mirkin, 'T1he Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative"
(1964) 9 Utah L. Rev. 254; F.M. Struve "The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and
Economic Due Process" (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1463. See generally L.M. Tribe, supra, note
14 at 722, and in particular US. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); N.A.A.C.P v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
23 For a general review of the jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission
of Human Rights, see J. Ross, "Limitations on Human Rights in International Law: Their
Relevance to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 6 Hum. Rights Q. 180
at 213-14. Of the cases cited by Ross, the most pertinent and interesting for our purposes
is the British "Closed Shop case." See Young James and Webster v. UK (1981), 2 H.R.LJ.
185.
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It was to be expected that the principle of the reasonable
alternative would be readily applied by our Courts and incorporated
into our legal precedents because it is so fundamental to the moral
ideals which, as we have just seen, underlie our system of
government. Thus it is a central tenet of most, if not all, liberal
theories of law that equality of personhood, which I have
characterized as the first principle of social justice, should be
secured, all other things being equal, at the highest degree possible.
Described in this way, the principle might, as I have noted, more
aptly be characterized as the maximization principle. As Gregory
Vlastos, a contemporary liberal philosopher, has put it:
if a legislature had before it two bills, B(L) and B(M), such that B(L) would

provide for greater personal freedom than would B(M), then, other things remaining
equal, they would be voting unjustly if they voted for the second...they would be

violating the human right to freedom of those affected by the legislation. A vote
for B(M) would be tantamount to a vote for the needless restriction of freedom.
And since freedom is a personal (or individual) 2 4right, to equalize its restriction
would be to aggravate, not alleviate, its injustice.

As well, a variation on this theme is at the root of Rawls' two
principles of justice 2s and has been routinely invoked by utilitarians,
as early as Bentham, for example, in their discussions of proper
principles of punishment. 26 In a sense we might say the principle is
the natural derivative of the interpretation of
the rule of law as the
27
reason.
of
law
paramount
a
to
commitment
If further justification were required for integrating this
principle of constitutional interpretation into the fabric of our
Charterjurisprudence, it could be observed that it accords with what
we usually think of as the institutional competence of the courts.

24 See G. Vlastos, "Justice and Equality" in R.B. Brandt, ed., Social Justice (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962) 31 at 62.
25 j. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) at

235.
26 j. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Nufner Publishing
Co., 1948) c. 13 and 14.
27 This formulation of the rule of law was attributed to Coke by Plucknett in T.F.T.
Plucknet, "Bonham's Case and Judicial Review" (1926) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 30. Also see, T.F.T.
Plucknet, A Concise History of the Common Law (London: Butterworth & Co. Ltd, 1936) at

51.
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Not only is the principle consistent with the language of the text
and the ideals of justice which underlie the Chatter, but as well the
principle only asks the court to do what we think this institution
does best. It avoids the difficult issue of specifying the extent to
which courts should evaluate the legitimacy of legislative ends.
Instead the principle focuses exclusively on the means adopted by
the legislature to accomplish its purposes. Rather than declaring to
the democratically elected forums of government that they are
prohibited from pursuing a particular substantive result, the principle
simply requires those institutions to proceed in a different, more
egalitarian, more liberal way. As a principle of judicial review it
interferes least in the policy-making function of government and in
so doing accords with the instinct of the courts to respect the will
of the representatives who have been selected by a majority of the
people to resolve such matters of policy.
With the two principles we have in hand we now have a
sufficiently rigorous standard of validation to test the various rules
and principles which distinguish our labour code. We have two
principles - one relating to ends and one to means - which together
tell as a purpose for which and the extent to which a legislature can,
under section 1, validly restrict the rights and freedoms the Charter
protects. So that I will not be misunderstood I should emphasize
again that the ensuing analysis is at best partial and incomplete. It
is not my intention to exhaustively review the constitutional integrity
of each and every detail of our labour code. Nor do I claim that
the principles I have derived from the Charter are themselves a
complete or comprehensive statement of judicial review. They are,
evidently, only part of that theory. My point is they will, for the
28
reasons I have described, be a part.
28 Of course, as a matter of positive constitutional law, other principles have been
identified by the Supreme Court of Canada to guide its evaluation of the constitutional
integrity of the various pieces of social policy that it has been asked to review. Foremost
among these is another proportionality principle, which weighs the benefits a particular law
is expected to provide to the community against the infringements on the constitutional rights
and freedoms of those it constrains. While clearly an established part of the Court's
perception of what is entailed by the process of judicial review, I will not make use of it in
the analysis that follows. To keep to my strategy of caution, I intend only to rely on
principles like equal personhood and least drastic means on which everyone who is committed
to our liberal democratic system of government can agree. Enjoying the universal support of
all sectors of our society, these principles have a neutrality which can ensure a measure of
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III. THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED
Having identified at least two principles to which a court
may have reference, in evaluating whether a piece of social policy is
consistent with our new constitutional guarantees, we can now turn
our attention to three different laws, which are part of our existing
labour code, and which are presently being reviewed by various
courts and administrative agencies to see how they might be applied
in practice. In this part we will explore whether our two principles
of constitutional review will yield determinative results which
promote or enhance the democratic, participatory quality of our
processes of government in the way I described in the introductory
part. In each of the examples, the analysis will remain unchanged.
Each of our principles - one relating to ends and the other to
means - will be invoked to determine whether these rules, some of
which have been part of our labour law for a very long time, can be
justified constitutionally.
A. Agricultural Workers
The treatment that farmworkers have received from our
democratically elected legislatures provides one of the simplest
examples of how empowering the Charter can be when it is
interpreted according to the principles we have just identified. Like
domestics, 29 agricultural workers are among the most economically
exploited and politically neutralized individuals in our society.
Because they are drawn heavily from a migrant and immigrant
population, these workers face even more serious obstacles to
effective participation in the political process than most. Typically,

objectivity in the judicial process that a principle which balances benefits and costs does not
so easily attract. For many critics, balancing of the latter kind is unavoidably subjective and
ultimately an unprincipled basis on which to ground decisions. See for example, T.A.
Aleinkoft, "Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing" (1987) 96 Yale LJ. 943; S.R. Peck,
"An Analytic Framework for the Application of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms"
(1986) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1.
29 For a discussion of the parallel plight of domestic workers in our society, see D.
Beatty, supra, note 3 at 92-93.
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these workers have not been covered by many of the most important
parts of our labour code, including minimum standards governing
overtime rates, workers' compensation as well as our collective
bargaining laws.
Denying agricultural workers the benefits and protection of
these major industrial relations policies strikes most people as being
flagrantly unjust.
Those who are already among the least
advantaged in our society are required to labour in conditions of
hardship and injustice which these industrial relations policies were
meant to eradicate. In the case of their exclusion from our
collective bargaining laws, it means that the legal processes we have
designed to enable workers to be involved in decision-making at the
workplace in a realistic way are unavailable to people who work on
farms. It means that a group of workers, who are already among
the least powerful, are given even less opportunity than the rest of
us to participate in the formulation and application of the rules
which govern the conditions under which each of us must work.
The blanket exclusion of farm workers from our collective bargaining
laws is a deliberate decision of the legislative branch and those in
the majority of our community not to show the same respect for the
farm workers' freedom of association as is shown for their brothers
and sisters who work in the industrial and service sectors of our
economy.
It may be that the recent judgments of the Supreme Court
of Canada, holding that section 2(d) of the Charterdoes not provide
any protection to the right to strike and bargain collectively, may
now make a free standing argument based on freedom of association
difficult to sustain. 30 Still, the exclusion of farm workers from our
collective bargaining laws seems a clear violation of their
constitutional right to receive the equal benefit and protection of
that body of law. The exclusion denies them the equal protection
and benefit of that body of rules our community has designed to
ensure that our ethical ideals of democracy and personal self-

30 See Re Alberta Public Service Employee RelationsAct, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Re Public
Service Alliance of Canada et aL v. The Queen et aL, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and Government of
Saskatchewan et al v. Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 544 et aL, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 460, 38 D.L.R. 4th 161, 249, 277. For a comment on these decisions see Beatty &
Kennett, supra, note 4.
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government are recognized as much in the procedures through
which personal relations are reconciled in the workplace as they are
in the larger institutions we use to govern our society at large.
Compared to other workers with whom they are similarly situated,
farm workers in most parts of Canada have been treated
discriminatorily and in a way which is fundamentally inconsistent
with the tenets of a society which by its constitution claims to be
both democratic and free. Denying them the opportunity to engage
in collective bargaining means they can not benefit from or be
protected by those legal rules and processes which allow most
people some opportunity to participate in the rule-making process
in the workplace. This exclusion prevents them from using what
many would regard as one of the most important legal instruments
they have to exercise some influence in the formulation of the rules
which govern their lives. Treating agricultural workers in this way
discriminates against them in the very way section 15 was meant to
prescribe. 31
Historically, agricultural workers have had little success in
persuading politicians to correct this injustice. In most parts of
Canada they have never been able to engage legislators and their
executives in a meaningful dialogue in which the latter have shown
they were amenable to righting this wrong. With the grafting of a
process of constitutional review onto our system of government, the
inability of farm workers to participate effectively in the design of
this central aspect of our industrial relations system should be
brought to an end. On the interpretation of the Charter that I have
proposed, judicial review offers farmworkers the opportunity to have
a conversation with the legislators of the most meaningful kind.32
In the past, when farm workers have complained directly to
governments that they have not been given the opportunity to
participate democratically in the decision-making processes of the

31 See, for example, Kask v. Shimizu et aL, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 154, 28 D.L.R. (4th) 64

(Alta Q.B); Streng et at v. Corporationof the Township of Winchester (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th)
734, 56 O.R. (2d) 649 (S.C.).

32 This opportunity has been seized by one group of workers, who have made an
application to the Ontario Labour Relations Board to have the United Food and Commercial

Workers International Union, Local 195 certified as their bargaining agent for purposes of
negotiating a collective agreement with their employer Cuddy Chicks.
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enterprises in which they work, governments have responded in two
ways. First, it was said that to allow the system of decision-making
which we use in our factories to be employed on our farms would
cause labour costs to rise to the detriment of consumers or to the
farmers (employers) themselves if the increased costs could not be
passed on. The second response was more narrowly focused and
contends that collective bargaining would substantially interfere
with,
33
and ultimately jeopardize, the existence of the family farm.
However successful the first argument has been in debates
in the legislature, it is clear it would have little force in a
conversation in our courts. It directly contradicts our constitutional
commitment to respect a basic equality between individuals in the
control they retain over their lives. If indeed collective bargaining
does increase the costs of labour to the overall detriment of society,
then our legislators should repeal the legislation in its entirety rather
than selectively excluding those most in need of its protection. The
legislature has not given credence to this argument for the rest of
the workforce. Workers who are in similar circumstances are able
to choose collective bargaining as the process by which they will
participate in decision-making in the workplace and settle, for
example, the amount of remuneration they will receive. Where it
is determined financial relief is required to offset any adverse
economic consequences collective bargaining may entail, direct
subsidies, in the form of grants, allowances, tax credits and the like,
are recognized as the most reasonable means of providing such
assistance.
Our constitutional commitment to respect each person's
opportunity to control his or her development and secure the equal
benefit and protection of our laws requires that agricultural workers
be treated the same. The argument from financial consequences,
while obviously a powerful one in a legislative process, where the
farm lobby has traditionally been very strong, offers no principled
basis on which the differential treatment of agricultural workers can
be defended constitutionally. If anything, their already inferior
economic status would demand that agricultural workers receive

33 See Labour Law Casebook Group, Labour Law: Cases, Materialsand Comnentary,
4th ed. (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1986) at 130.
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more, not less, protection from the industrial relations policies we
enact into law. If, by the exclusion, government intended to provide
a subsidy to the farm sector and/or to the consumers of agricultural
products, it would have to extend the subsidy directly and not in a
way which compromised the constitutional entitlements of those who
toil in the fields, in order to satisfy the two principles we have been
applying.
The second response, however, is a principled argument in

a way the first is not. It can be argued, I think, that the family
farm implies a way of life, a form of social organization, which is
distinguishable from that which prevails in our factories and office
buildings. The types of personal relationships implied by each are
sufficiently unique to suggest that different decision-making
processes may be appropriate to regulate the distinctive relations in

each of these social spheres. Thus, if it can be established that
collective bargaining is actually antagonistic to the way of life that

is carried on in a family environment, the equal personhood of those
who desire to pursue the pastoral path may provide a principled
basis on which to limit the reach of collective bargaining statutes.
Here, rights collide and in such circumstances some limitation on
personal freedom is inevitable. In this situation the freedom of
those who choose to experience their lives in such non-commercial,
self-sustaining, ways may justify restraining the freedom of others
who would wish to associate with them in a way which would
threaten or deny them the opportunity to realize their choice.
It is not necessary for us to finally determine whether
excluding individuals who labour on family farms from collective
bargaining legislation would ultimately be sustained. Even if it could
be established that denying those who work on family farms the
protection and benefit of the policies we have designed for collective
decision-making in the workplace could be demonstrably justified in
a society which claimed to be democratic and free, it should be clear
that that would be the limit of such an exemption. The claim of
preserving a unique form of social organization like the family farm,
while a principled argument, could never justify denying all
agricultural workers the opportunity to make use of and participate
in democratic processes of decision-making as most of the Labour
Relations Acts across Canada do. Drafting the exclusion of
farmworkers, to include those who work for large corporate
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agribusinesses is much wider and more inclusive than it needs to
be.34 If a Legislature's purpose is to preserve the family farm, a
blanket exclusion of all farmworkers is a needless and therefore
unreasonable denial of their equality and restriction of their
freedom. For a society committed to the ideals of freedom and
democracy, the only principled way to justify such a limitation on the
rights and freedoms of individuals who work in agriculture is to limit
it to those who actually toil on family farms.
So, in the kinds of conversations that are held in the courts,
it can be seen how groups like farm workers, who have been
relatively powerless in the processes of politics and have suffered the
consequences of their impotence, can invoke the Chatter and the
moral authority of our third branch of government to expose
injustices under which they have been forced to labour for far too
long. The example of farm workers shows directly how empowering,
in terms of democratic decision-making, this new process of judicial
review can be. Because they can participate more equally in this
new process of transforming policy into law than they generally can
in the backrooms of the legislature, farmworkers can insist that they
be given the equal benefit and protection of that body of law which
our society has fashioned to introduce the methods of democratic
decision-making into the places people work. While realpolitik
explanations are readily at hand to show why those who are already
relatively disadvantaged will often fare poorly in the legislative and
executive branches of our government, there is no principled reason
why these workers should not enjoy the same benefit and protection
of our system of collective bargaining as everyone else. In the
context of a constitutional conversation, the fact a worker toils for
large commercial enterprises in a field rather than in a plant or an
office, does not provide an adequate reason why he or she should
be burdened more than anyone else and in all events more than
need be. Such an argument is fundamentally inconsistent with our
constitutional ideal of equality of liberty and personal selfgovernment.

34See, for example, IndustrialRelationsAct, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-4, s. 1(5)(a).
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B. Mandatory Retirement
The rules which compel people to give up their jobs at age
sixty-five are among the mainstays of Canadian employment law.
For huge numbers of people in Canada, working life traditionally
ends at age sixty-five. For the majority of Canadian workers these
laws are not coercive or objectionable in any way. Early retirement,
especially for those whose jobs are too small for their spirits, is
much the preferred
choice to working until one reaches 70 or more
35
years of age.
For others though, especially those who occupy jobs which
are intellectually, emotionally and/or financially rewarding, mandatory
retirement forces them out of the workforce against their will. For
these people, the venerability of these rules do not immunize them
from the charge that they are inconsistent with our constitutional
commitment to respect the equal autonomy of each member of our
community whenever we reasonably can. Being cut off by law from
paid employment when one turns sixty-five is, prima facie, a
violation of a person's constitutional rights when it is done without
their consent and without regard to their ability to continue work.36
Terminating people from their employment in such a fashion
seriously discriminates against them by denying their equal freedom
to pursue their chosen vocations simply on account of their age. A
worker aged sixty-five is no different, qua worker, than his or her
colleague who is sixty-four. For most academics, legislators, and

35 See M. Gunderson & J. Pesando, 'q"he Case for Allowing Mandatory Retirement"
(1988) 14 Can. Pub. Pol. 32 at 34.

36 It should be acknowledged that for many, including virtually every judge who has
considered the constitutionality of mandatory retirement rules, there will be a serious
preliminary issue as to whether the Charter would have any application to most of these rules
which do not seem to be the product of the legislature, but rather are the result of individual

or collective agreements. See, for example, Harrison v. U.B.C. (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 687,
21 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 (C.A.); and Douglas College Faculty Association v. Douglas College,
unreported judgment of the B.C.C.A. date Jan. 6, 1988. For a discussion of the reach of the
Charter on this issue, see Beatty, supra, note 3 at 94-100. See also D. Beatty, "Constitutional
Conceits: The Coercive Authority of Courts" (1987) 37 U.T.L.J. 183.
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courts the discrimination seems plain.3 7 The only serious issue is
whether, in a free and democratic society such a distinction is one
whose reasonableness can be "demonstrably justified."
At this stage of a conversation about the constitutional
validity of our rules mandating retirement at age sixty-five, the focus
should shift and, as in the case of farm-workers, the discussion
would centre on the objectives this policy was meant to serve and
the means it employed to secure them. Once again, a dialogue
would explore whether, evaluated in terms of its means and ends, a
rule which terminates people from their employment at a specified
age is justified even though it denies people's constitutional
entitlement to receive equal benefit and protection of the law
without discrimination on account of age.
Supporters of mandatory retirement rules argue these laws
are "demonstrably justified". They point to the large number of

important social objectives that these rules help secure 38 . They say,
as a matter of economic well-being, society as a whole gains by rules
which mandate retirement at a specified age. Rationalizing longterm, deferred-compensation packages, harmonizing standardized
public and private sector pension plans, and avoiding administrative
and monitoring costs of employee performance are among the more
commonly cited benefits mandatory retirement schemes are said to
accomplish.
In addition, making more jobs and promotion
opportunities available to younger workers, as well as reducing risks

37 For academics, see D. Gibson, "Distinguishing the Governors from the Governed"
(1983) 13 Man. LJ. 505; and K. Klare, 'The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle
Against Racism: Perspectives from Labour Law and Civil Rights Law" (1982) 61 Ore. L. Rev.
157. See also Mi. Perry, 'The Principle of Equal Protection" (1981) 32 Hastings L. J. 1133.
For legislators, see, for example, Equaliy for All: Report of the Parliamentary Committee on
Equalit, Rights (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1985) at 21; The Human
Rights Act, S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 6(1). For courts, see Re McKinney and Board of Governors of
die University of Guelph et aL (1987), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 65 (affd. (1987), 46 D.L.R. (4th) 193
(C.A.), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada granted 46 O.L.R. (4th) 193)
[hereinafter McKinney]; Harrison v. U.B.C., ibid. See also Craton v. Winnipeg School Division
No. 1 (1985), 61 NR 241, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150 where the Supreme Court held that the
mandatory retirement rule in the public schools of Manitoba was inconsistent with the human
rights code. Given the common purpose and parallel language of our human rights laws and
the Charter, it would be expected that a similar ruling will eventually prevail in our
constitutional law as well.
38 These are summarized in M. Gunderson & J. Pesando, supra, note 35 at 35.
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to health and safety that may be caused by employees being unable
to discharge their duties on account of their age, are invariably
offered in the catalogue of objectives this long-standing rule of our
labour code has been intended to promote.
On this point, it seems certain that proponents of mandatory
retirement will carry the day. All of the courts who have considered
this question have recognized that in theory most, if not all, of these
39
goals are perfectly valid objectives for a community to pursue.
None conflicts with our principle of equal personhood and one of
them, the objective of work sharing, is directly supportive of it.
However else mandatory retirement may be justified, it seems
undeniable that this law of termination promotes our commitment
to respecting an equal opportunity for every individual to control
their own destiny by sharing the work of a community when it is
scarce. It operates as one of a number of different laws in our
labour code, which limit the time people can work in a day or a
week or a lifetime, in order to help ensure everyone has some
minimum and in that sense equal opportunity to work. Michael
Perry has put the justification in these terms:
What does the choice to retire persons by age imply? Most persons need to be
engaged in %work", in the sense of productive activity that contributes, in some
fashion, to the material or spiritual well-being of the community. Certainly this is

a need older persons have as well as younger persons. But older persons have had
their chance - their turn - to satisfy that need (which ought not to be confused

with financial need, which is a distinct matter). Surely it is not unreasonable, or
morally
improper, to think that younger persons ought to be given their chance
40
too

As a derivation of our principle of equality of personhood,
Perry's is certainly an argument which can fairly be advanced in the
kind of dialogue courts entertain to assist in their evaluation of the
39 It might be noted, however, that both the B.C. Court of Appeal and Mr. Justice Gray
of the Ontario Supreme Court expressed the view that mandatory retirement rules could not
be justified as substitutes for more demanding and costly modes of performance evaluation.
Relying on a passage in the judgment of Madame Justice Wilson in Re Singh and Minister of
Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1S.C.R. 178 at 184ff, the argument that mandatory
retirement could be justified on the basis of administrative convenience was rejected out of
hand. See Harrison v. UB.C., supra, note 36; Stoffinan et aL v. Vancouver General lospital
et aL (1986), 30 D.L.R. (4th) 700, 25 C.R.R. 16 (B.C.S.C.) (leave granted for appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada, 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxii); and McKinney, supra, note 37.
40 M. Perry, supra, note 37 at 1155.
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constitutionality of the different features of our labour code. For
the same reason that it would be legitimate to distinguish between
workers in their termination from employment on the basis of their
age when it is a bona fide occupational qualification 41 , so justifying
mandatory retirement as part of a work-sharing policy fits squarely
within our first principle of constitutional review. Whatever other
objectives it may or may not serve, mandatory retirement clearly
enhances equality of personhood in our community by protecting an
equal opportunity to work for every member of our society.
Some might be inclined to resist even this conclusion on the
ground that it rests on a common and fatal mistake. Coined by
economists as "the lump of labour fallacy," the argument is that it is
both logically and empirically incorrect to assume that forcing older
workers to retire will increase the number of jobs and promotional
opportunities for younger members of the workforce. The thesis is
one which seems to have the general endorsement of the economics
community at large, although in any given case its application is still
a matter of some debate and dispute.4 2
For our purposes it is not necessary to explore the validity
of the charge. On the principles and strategy of judicial review to
which we are committed, it is not for the court to judge the wisdom
or effectiveness of a rule or policy which a legislature has chosen to
pursue. Such an argument might be pertinent under a quite
separate proportionality principle, in which the benefits of a social
policy are weighed against the cost to our constitutional order.4 3 It
should not, however, be invoked when the only question before the
court is whether a particular rule enhances our constitutional
commitment to equality of liberty in the most reasonable way that
41 See D. Beatty, supra, note 3 at 101-02.
42 The issue is raised in M. Gunderson & J. Pesando, supra, note 35 at 35-36.
43 Supra, note 27. In Harrison v. U.B.C., supra, note 36, the British Columbia Court of

Appeal made reference to the lump of labour theory in rejecting the University's argument
that mandatory retirement was a legitimate way of opening up job opportunities to younger
members of the workforce. Although I have tried to avoid commenting on the merits of
judgments offered in individual cases, it might be observed that the courts' conclusion on this
issue seemed to be predicated on the evidence (or lack of evidence) that had been put before

it and the judgment seems to contemplate that in the appropriate circumstances, such as those
which faced the Ontario Court of Appeal in McKinney, its conclusion could easily be

otherwise.
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it can. Here the only issue before the Court is the integrity, not the
practicality, of the purposes lawmakers pursue.
So on this point of the debate there seems no doubt as to
which side is right. It is abundantly clear that the objectives which
mandatory retirement seeks to accomplish are entirely consistent
with our two principles of constitutional interpretation. However,
when it comes to evaluating the means mandatory retirement rules
use to further these objectives, supporters of mandatory retirement
don't fare nearly so well. Indeed it seems to me that the
inadequacy and defect in the method of our existing mandatory
retirement rules is as certain and demonstrable as the validity of the
ends they are intended to promote. Quite simply, all of the
objectives of compulsory retirement that we have just identified
could be pursued just as effectively through alternate rules which
compromise our constitutional guarantee to equal benefit and
protection of the law without discrimination based on age much less.
In the end, there is no adequate response that can be
mounted to counter the challenge that mandatory retirement rules,
based on a person's age, are badly overdrawn given the objectives
they are meant to accomplish. If, for example, the rationale for
selecting age sixty-five as the criterion on which termination from
employment would be effected is that it protects the settled
expectations of contributors to pensions, then there are more
reasonable ways of accomplishing that objective. "Grandfathering"
those cases where settled expectations would be upset if the normal
retirement age were changed is the most obvious alternative which
would compromise our constitutional commitment to equality and
liberty much less than imposing a mandatory age of retirement in
perpetuity. As an actuarial matter, there appears to be no reason
why the pension schemes of the vast majority of working people
could not be adjusted to allow them to retire whenever they chose
with appropriate alterations being made to the size of their pensions.
As a practical matter, pension plans can easily be designed to
dovetail with retirements at virtually any age at which an employee
chooses to leave work or with retirements which are activated by
factors like years of employment which are wholly unconnected with
a person's age. If, for some reason, redesigning pension plans to
conform more closely to our constitutional ideals threatens the
settled expectations of some workers and/or their employers then a
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grandfathering law, sanctioning retirement at age sixty-five just for
them, would be demonstrably more justifiable because it would
impair the right to equality of treatment much less than a mandatory
rule of termination for everyone when they turn sixty-five.
Equally if, as many believe, youth employment is an
important objective that mandatory retirement is thought to serve,
again alternate means or criteria exist by which these purposes can
be achieved in a way which compromises our constitutional
commitment to equal liberty substantially less. Alternate legal rules
are available which can be drawn much more closely to achieve the
purposes of sharing work between the older and younger members
of the community. Retirement on the basis of years of employment,
rather than years of age, is the most obvious alternate that springs
to mind. 44 Using a criterion of years of work, rather than years of
age, serves the policy objective of sharing work in a way that is
more sensitive to our constitutional values because it does not
stereotype all older workers as having enjoyed long careers, and
because of that it would impair much less the equality rights section
15 is designed to protect. Limiting the number of years a person
can occupy a (scarce) opportunity to work does less violence to our
constitutional commitments than the rule we now use.
For large numbers of workers - especially females who for
family and related reasons often choose to enter the workforce and
pursue their occupational ambitions at a later phase of their lives the conventional rule of retirement at age 65 does not guarantee
the same degree of equality of opportunity and freedom of
association as one which is predicated on years of service. Because
people begin to work at different stages in their lives, basing
termination on years of service rather than years of living, makes the
opportunity to work, which is so integral to our dignity and self
respect, 45 available on a more equal basis.
If mandatory retirement rules were redesigned in this way
they would fit comfortably within a constitutional system of industrial
relations. In circumstances where there is a shortage of workers 44 For an example of where a legislature has used both, see the Constabulary (Pensions)
Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 59, s. 2(1)(n)(iii).

45 D. Beatty, supra, note 3 at 15-20.
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as may well happen after the baby boomers move through their
careers, or where work is not so attractive as to incline people to
hang on as long as they can - one would not expect the parties to
include such a rule of termination in their legal regime. Conversely
where such distributive rules were desirable, each work community
could, consistent with our constitutional commitment to pluralism
and free choice, decide for itself the occasions on which and the
circumstances in which any person could be said to have had his or
her fair share of relevant work experience. Individualized decisions
related to the work experience of each employee would replace the
arbitrary stereotyping that infects our current legal regime.
If a constitutional conversation about the integrity of our
rules of mandatory retirement took this path it could, I think, be
offered as a second example of the hypothesis I proposed that
reasoned discourse can enhance the participatory, democratic
character of our system of government and the laws it produces.
Although none of the lower courts which have passed judgment on
this rule of compulsory termination have responded to this dialogue
so far,46 the conversation we have just constructed does show that,
if one adheres to the two principles we have identified, the
symbiosis between courts and legislatures can be an entirely
sympathetic and cooperative one. The relationship between the
courts and the other two branches of government need not be so
hostile and antagonistic as the critics commonly suppose. In this
example what the members of the third branch of the government
would be telling legislatures and their executives is that if they
decide that it is necessary or desirable to adopt a rule or policy to
distribute valuable, life-giving resources, like jobs, among its
members, it should formulate it in a way which does not impact
adversely or discriminate unfairly against particular persons. They
would have fulfilled the role of an active social critic or a wakened
conscience by identifying alternate policies which can realize the
objective of sharing valuable work opportunities in a way which
showed more respect for our constitutional guarantees. It would be

46 See, for example, McKinney, supra, note 37; Connell and Harrison v. U.B.C., supra,
note 36.
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advising (but not compelling)47 legislators how a rule of compulsory
retirement would have to be formulated if it is to be constitutionally
pure.
Still some critics might remain unpersuaded. I can imagine
someone saying that even if, on the principles we are employing,
there were determinative "right answers" to the question of the
constitutional validity or our existing mandatory retirement rules, this
example hardly supports my characterization of the judicial branch
of our government as being especially hospitable to those people
who traditionally have not enjoyed much influence in and access to
the processes of politics. If the personal characteristics of the
people who have launched the current challenges to our mandatory
retirement laws are representative, then this example of
constitutional litigation seems to benefit older, white, middle class
males - individuals who already enjoy numerous advantages and
benefits which are not available to many others. 48 How, it might be
asked, would the judicial negation of this expression of the popular
will promote the democratic quality of our system of government or
the well-being of those who are relatively less well off?
The suspicion that even if the process of judicial review was
coherent, or possible in some logical or theoretical sense, it may just
as well enure to the benefit of those already better off, is not
entirely unfounded. Certainly in the cases of mandatory retirement
that have come before the courts so far, individuals who are already
quite privileged in our society have been using the Charterto secure
additional advantages they could not persuade other law makers to
enact. However, at least in the instant case, this perception of the
critic does not seem to be warranted. It is in fact predicated on an
adversarial and confrontational structure of government that I
alluded to above. White, affluent males will be able to effectively
frustrate the will of the people to share its valuable public resources
only if our lawmakers refused to acknowledge the integrity of
constitutional opinion they receive. If, by contrast, as in the more
cooperative model I have envisioned, legislators reacted positively to
the alternatives that have been suggested to them, then this
47

Supra, note 7.

48 See M. Gunderson & J. Pesando, supra, note 35.
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dialogue, like the one initiated by the farmworkers, would support
the thesis I postulated in the introduction of this essay.
First, as we have seen, if mandatory retirement rules were
based on the number of years a person occupied a valuable
resource, rather than on the number of years she has lived, large
numbers of female workers would benefit substantially. Redesigning
compulsory retirement rules in this way would give this group of
persons, who traditionally have been badly under-represented in the
processes of politics, a much more equal opportunity to make use of
resources (jobs) which offer enormous opportunities for a person to
live their lives with dignity and self respect. And, female workers
would not be the only individuals who would likely benefit if law
makers tried to live up to the moral advice that was offered by the
courts. Younger workers, who also have traditionally had little or
no representation in the process of politics, would likely gain as well.
In addition to abandoning the criterion of years of age, it would
seem that another quite radical change in the current formulation of
mandatory retirement schemes would be required for these rules to
meet our two principles of review. Thus, if the state, (or those to
whom it has delegated its authority) in justifying the rules of
involuntary retirement, claims to be creating a legal environment in
which each person has an equal opportunity to engage his or her
talents productively, then it would also be bound to demonstrate
that it had taken whatever complementary initiatives were necessary
to ensure that the employment opportunities created by the
retirements did not disappear. 49 As part of a job-sharing policy, a
rule of mandatory retirement can not be effective by itself. In order
to establish its bona fides, it would be incumbent on the legal
authority imposing the rule to implement whatever complementary
policies were necessary to ensure some sharing of jobs was actually
achieved. Without a commitment of that kind it simply cannot be

The Constitutional Court in Spain basically came to the same conclusion when it
considered a mandatory retirement rule in the Spanish Workers' Code. The decision is
reported in Boletin Oficial del Estado Gaceta De Madrid, 20 July 1981, supplemental Num

172, 16,237. For a summary of this decision, see "Judicial Decisions in the Field of Labour
Law" (1984) 123 Int. Lab. Rev. 183 at 193-94.
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assumed that rules of mandatory retirement will function as the jobsharing instruments that they profess to be.5 0
If such a condition were attached to rules of mandatory
retirement, they would qualify immediately for inclusion in a
constitutional labour code. A programme coordinating the
retirement of people after a maximum number of years of service
with the entry of new workers to the positions just vacated would
be consistent with the principles of interpretation with which we
have been working. As amended, compulsory retirement rules would
complement other work sharing policies such as laws which regulate
the amount of overtime that can be worked or which integrate
unemployment insurance benefits with shorter work weeks. It would
further the constitutional objective of equalizing access to work
opportunities by imposing a ceiling on the quantity of work a person
could reasonably expect to claim over the course of his or her life
just as these other parallel standards regulate the amount of
employment a person can claim in a day and week5 So designed,
even the economists' concerns that mandatory retirement rules do
not achieve their objective of sharing work would be met.
On this scenario, a conversation about the constitutional
validity of compulsory retirement rules provides a second example
of how groups who traditionally have not been well represented in
our political institutions can make use of the process of judicial
review to claim a greater measure of concern and respect. A
constitutional regime of compulsory retirement would be beneficial
both to the younger members of the workforce and to female
workers. Retirement by years of service would relieve the hardship
and injustice suffered by those (predominantly female) workers who
have had relatively short careers and who will have few pension
credits on which they can live after they turn sixty-five.
Conditioning enforced retirements on a commitment not to reduce
the employment opportunities which are created by such a rule
would also promote a more equal opportunity for the youth in our
workforce to embark on careers that parallel those who have come
before them.
50 M. Gunderson & J. Pesando, supra, note 35.

51 See, for example, Emplo)7nent Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, ss 17-21.
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C. The Right of a Worker to Sue His or Her Employer for Wrongful
Death or Injury in Tort
The concern that we have just considered, that judicial
review may be of more assistance to those who are already
influential in and/or well treated by the processes of politics, and
may not be particularly sensitive to the interests of those who are
relatively less well off, is especially acute for some people when they
contemplate a third constitutional challenge that has been aimed at
our labour laws. This attack involves a claim that the standard
immunity from civil liability rules, which deny workers the
opportunity to sue their employers when they negligently harm them
at work, and which have been a part of every Workers'
Compensation Act in Canada since their inception, violate workers'
entitlement to the equal benefit and protection of tort law.52 Here,
a part of a social policy, which is held out as a model by the rest of
the world53 and which has been of unquestioned benefit to
thousands of Canadian workers for almost three quarters of a
century, seems in danger of being struck down. If the courts rule
that the impugned sections violate the rights of persons who are
injured at and in the course of their employment to the equal
benefit and protection of our law of tort, some predict that both the
democratic quality of our system of government and the well-being
of those who have suffered crippling misfortune will be seriously
compromised.5 4 In this case, the critics might be expected to say,
the true character of judicial review is revealed in that an unelected,
elite group of judges is able to undermine one of the most

52 See, for example, Workers' Compensation Act, S.N. 1983, c. 48, ss 32, 34; Workcrs'
Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, ss 8(9),(11); Workers' CompensationAct, R.S.A. 1981,
c. W-16, s. 18(1).
53 See G.W.R. Palmer, "Abolishing the Personal Injury Tort System: The New Zealand
Experience" (1971) 9 Alta. L. Rev. 169 at 189.
54 In the constitutional reference that was formulated following the decision of the
Newfoundland Supreme Court in Piercey v. General Bakeries Ltd (1987), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 373,

61 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 147, intervenors from across the country submitted affidavits from a
number of scholars and administrators that such a negative effect was inevitable. In resisting
these predictions, I should acknowledge that I acted as co-counsel for Mrs. Piercey in the

reference.
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progressive and universally supported pieces of social legislation that
has been developed by our legislatures and their executives.
If one applies the framework of analysis we have been
following so far, it would seem that there is a very legitimate basis
for such a fear. Certainly on the principles of constitutional
interpretation that we have been using, these sections of our
Workers' Compensation Acts seem to directly contradict section 15
of the Charter. It is not, I think, difficult to establish that a
prohibition against workers suing their employers for wrongful injury
violates their constitutional rights to the equal benefit and protection
of our law of torts. First, it seems beyond dispute that workers as
individuals and as a class have been denied the equal benefit and
protection of those principles of tort law which are available to
everyone else in the community who are victims of irresponsible
and/or wrongful behaviour. What this rule states is that if two
individuals are injured in an automobile accident caused by the
wrongdoing of a third, one of whom is on her way to and in the
course of her work and the other is on her way to and in the course
of shopping, only the latter will be able to claim the benefit and
protection of our principles of tort law. Compared to other victims
of accidents and misfortune with whom they are "similarly situated",
injured workers are denied the opportunity to obtain corrective
justice from those who have harmed them wrongfully.55
Although one might initially be tempted to say that workers
are not discriminated against because all - or mostly all5 6 - workers

55 Courts generally have accepted the idea that the "analytical point of departure in any
s. 15 complaint" is to determine whether the challenger has been treated differently - viz.

unequally - compared with others who are situated in similar circumstances: see R v. Century
21 Ramos Realty Inc. (1987), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 649, 58 O.R. (2d) 737 (C.A.); Smith line &
French LaboratoriesLtd et aL v. Attorney General of Canada (1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 584, 12
C.P.R. (3d) 385 (F.C.A.); Re Andrews and Law Society of British Columbia et aL (1986), 27
D.L.R. (4th) 660 (B.C.C.A.), 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 305, (S.C.C. judgment released); Re Blainey and
Ontario Hockey Association et aL, supra, note 12; Re McDonald and The Queen (1985), 21
D.L.R. (4th) 397, 51 O.R. (2d) 745 (C.A.); P. Westen, 'The Empty Idea of Equality" 95 Harv.

L. Rev. 537 at 542-43. But see the judgment of Morgan J.A. in Re Validity of Sections 32 &
34 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1983 (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 501, 67 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
16 (Nfld. C.A.).
56 As we noted in our discussion of the rules which deny agricultural workers the benefit
and protection of our collective bargaining laws, workers who are amongst the least
advantaged in our community are frequently excluded from our Workers Compensation Laws
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are treated alike, on reflection the flaw in that reasoning becomes
apparent to most. To adopt that strategy would lead to results in
which laws which sanctioned the discriminatory treatment of women
or native people would be upheld as well so long as all - or mostly
all - individuals in those groups were burdened in the same way.
To determine whether someone has been treated equally or
differently than another one must look to the purpose of the law
rather than the classification or characterizing trait that it uses. 57 As
our standard treatises on the principles of tort law make abundantly
clear, doing corrective justice between persons who act irresponsibly
and those they injure is one of the core purposes this body of law
is expected to achieve.5 8 Given that objective, it is other victims of
torts, and not other workers, who are the relevant group of
comparison in determining whether those injured in the course of
their employment have been denied the equal benefit and protection
of the law. Comparing victims of accidents in the workplace to
those whose misfortune occurs in some other location, the impugned
rules treat the former unequally, by denying them opportunities and
entitlements (our rules of tort) that are enjoyed by everyone else.
Moreover, rules of this kind are blatantly discriminatory, at
least in the sense that the Charter understands that word. The
inequality imposes a burden which directly threatens individual
autonomy and the possibility of self rule. These sections of our
Workers' Compensation Acts deny individual workers the protection
and benefit of that body of rules which our society has devised to
as well. Agricultural workers, entertainers, and domestics are among those most commonly
denied the benefit of these schemes of no-fault, work related, accident compensation schemes.
See, for example, Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, s. 131; Workers'
Compensation Regulations (Newfoundland) 1984, 330/83, s. 6.
57 3. Tussman & 3. TenBroek "The Equal Protection of the Laws" (1949) 37 Calif. L.
Rev. 341 at 344. This seminal work has repeatedly been cited by Canadian Courts in their
interpretation of s. 15 as the analytical point of departure in determining whether a law which
treats people differently is a violation of their constitutional rights. See, for example, R v.
Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc., supra, note 55; R v. RL. (1986), 14 O.A.C. 318, 27 C.R.R. 30
(C.A.); Re Andrews and Law Society of British Columbia et aL, supra, note 54.
58 For a description of the fundamental character of tort law, as a means by which
corrective justice can be done in the community, see A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 3d
ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) at 13-14; E. Weinrib, 'oward a Moral Theory of
Negligence Law" in Bayles & Chapman eds, Justice, Rights and Tort Law (Boston: Reidel Co.,
1983).
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secure the physical integrity and personal dignity of people against
the irresponsible and wrongful behaviour of others. These rules fly
in the face of our constitutional commitment to the principle of
equal personhood. They deny the basic commitment of free and
democratic societies to show an equal respect for the inherent
dignity and inviolable rights of each person; in this case the long
standing civil or legal right to insist that corrective justice be done
between victim and wrongdoer.
Now as with each of the other two conversations that we
followed, at this stage of the discourse, the focus would shift to the
question of whether, even if the immunity sections violated the
constitutional rights of workers in this minimal, prima facie, way,
such rules are demonstrably justified in a society which is committed
to be both democratic and free 9 On the principles we are using
the issue would be whether these rules were necessary or the least
drastic means available to the legislature to accomplish the
compensatory, rehabilitative and preventative objectives that

Workers' Compensation Acts are expected to promote.
For our purposes, of testing the hypothesis that judicial
review can enhance the democratic character of our system of
government by providing an opportunity of participation to those
The cases, on who bears the onus to produce such evidence, proving on a balance
of probabilities that these sections of the Act are justified or not, are divided. Some have
adopted the view that the complainant bears the onus of proving these rules are not justifiable
(in order to establish a violation of s. 15) while others have held it falls to their supporters
to establish (under s. 1) that there are important considerations which justify the compromise
of the constitutional order that such laws entail. Compare Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia et al., supra, note 55 and R. v. Century 21 Ramos Realty Ltd, supra, note 55 with
McKinney, supra, note 37; Re Rebic and Collver et al. (1986), 22 C.R.R. 66 at 78 (B.C.C.A.),
and Smith, Kline and French LaboratoriesLtd v. Attorney General of Canada, supra, note 55.
It should be noted that both the Newfoundland Court of Appeal and the Ontario
Divisional Court have followed the first line of cases in dismissing the challenges to the
immunity sections of their Workers' Compensation Act on the ground that, considered as a
whole, this legislative regime is neither unfair nor unreasonable because it provides generous
benefits to workers in many circumstances where there would be no relief available at common
law. See Re Workers' Compensation Act; supra, note 55.
My own view is that the better position is that the question of whether a law which
discriminates adversely against individuals is unreasonable or unfair is best considered as a
matter of justification under s. 1. This interpretation is more consistent with the other
sections of the Charter (including s. 33) and it gives the Charter the large and liberal
interpretation our Supreme Court has recognized a constitution must be given if it is to
realize its ultimate objective of making Canadian society as democratic and free as it can be.
Oakes, supra, note 11.
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who are not especially effective in the processes of politics, we can
safely assume that these rules can not meet our second test of
constitutional review. There is much historical and empirical
evidence and analytical literature to support this position
and it
is this position which I believe shows judicial review in its best light.
In fact even the critics focus on this outcome in support of their
counterposition that judicial review can easily frustrate the will of
our popularly elected legislatures to the disadvantage of those who
are already relatively less well off. Making this assumtion, that these
sections can not be justified, at least in the form they are presently
drafted, should be congenial to both supporters and critics of judicial
review because each of them thinks that it provides evidence for
their side of the debate.
So, on the assumtion that on our two principles of
constitutional review, the Courts will strike down one of the longest
standing parts of our Workers' Compensation laws 61, what remains
to be considered is whether such a result would be consistent with
or a refutation of the thesis I have proposed of the judicial branch
of our government playing the role of social critic or moral
conscience in a way which furthers the deepest values implicit in our
liberal democratic tradition of government. Would such a ruling
show that individuals who have neither been particularly influential
in nor particularly well treated by the processes of politics will be
60 See text accompanying notes 63-67 infra.
61 The only other argument against such a conclusion would be that because the
discrimination that is effected by these sections is directed to workers as a class, rather than
to one of the enumerated grounds set out in s. 15, the Charterdoes not reach discrimination
of this kind. The language of s. 15 does not encourage such an interpretation and most courts
which have addressed this question have rejected the view that the enumerated grounds are
exhaustive of the kinds of discrimination that s. 15 prescribes: see ReAndrews and Law Society
of British Columbia et al., supra, note 55; Smith Kline and French LaboratoriesLtd v. A.-G.
Canada,supra, note 55; Streng et al. v. Corporation of the Township of Winchester, supra, note
4.
In determining what other acts of discrimination are prohibited beyond those
enumerated in the text it seems certain that the treatment these sections purport to allow
can no longer be tolerated under s. 15. These sections deny workers the benefit and
protection of that body of law which is central to the inherent dignity, and the physical and
psychological integrity of the person. They deny them the benefit and protection of some
of the most basic and long-standing sets of civil and legal rights which are directly related
to the general purposes and entitlements the Charteris, on the interpretation we are following,
meant to protect. See Kask v. Shimizu et aL, supra, note 31.
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able to do much better for themselves in the courts? Whose
interpretation of such a decision - the critics or the defenders of
judicial review - is the more plausible understanding of the event?
How you answer that question depends on the consequences
you expect will flow from such a decision. Whether a judgment
which says these sections of our Workers' Compensation Acts violate
section 15 of the Charter is a good or bad thing depends, once
again, on how you think the legislative and executive branches of
government will likely react to it. Some think that workers as a
group, and on the whole, will suffer from such a ruling because they
say that legislatures can be expected to allow their compensatory
systems of no-fault relief to atrophy on the basis that workers have
new opportunities to seek relief in tort.62 They predict that
legislators and their executives will succumb to pressures from
employers, who are faced with the increased cost of insuring against
such liability, to reduce benefit levels under Workers' Compensation.
Dual systems, integrating both no-fault and fault based principles of
relief, they say, unambiguously provide lower benefits to those
workers whose loss either can not be attributed to anyone's
irresponsibility or else can be directly attributed to their own.
Indeed, in terms of the standard formulations all constitutional
conversations will follow, they would say, even the possibility of such
an eventuality would provide adequate justification for their
validation under section 1.
In a sense, the thinking which underlies this interpretation
of a decision by the courts that these sections of our Workers'
Compensation system are constitutionally invalid parallels the fear
that annulling our current rules on mandatory retirement would
enure to the benefit of those already very powerful and well
advantaged. Both are predicated on a theory of politics in which
the judicial branch of our government is at war with and frustrating
62

Many of these opinions have been set out in affidavits commissioned specifically to
defend the constitutional challenge to these sections rather than in independent reports and
studies published in academic journals. See Re s. 32 and 34 of Newfoundland Workers'
Compensation Act, supra, note 55. For some, paid-for, solicited affidavits are less impartial
and objective than independent scholarly works and reports and so are, prima facie at least,
deserving of less weight and respect. See K. Swinton, "What Do The Courts Want From
The Social Sciences" and B. Morgan, "Proof of Facts in Charter Litigation" in Sharpe, ed.,

CharterLitigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) at 159, 187.
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the valid and important purposes of the other two. In different
ways, and for different reasons, each implicitly rejects the
cooperative model of intra-governmental relations that I have
postulated at the start.
In this case, the supposition is that legislatures and their
executives have neither the political means nor ethical will to resist
the pressures of employers to reduce benefits paid under the
legislation so that their costs will not be increased. The sceptics say
that even if a few individuals who were injured through the
wrongdoing of their employers might do better, workers as a whole
would be affected adversely. Even if a few might secure more
compensation on principles of tort, most injured workers would end
up getting less under the no-fault scheme.
If space allowed, and one were able to follow a conversation
about the constitutionality of this aspect of our Workers'
Compensation systems through to its natural conclusion, it could be
shown there is no logical, historical or empirical basis to ground this
belief. Logically, the supposition makes no sense. From the
inception of Workers' Compensation everyone has assumed that all
costs of accident compensation (the insurance premiums) would be
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices or back to
workers in the form of lower wages and benefits, depending on the
relative elasticities of supply and demand, just like any other factor
of production. 63 The force of this logic should be as compelling to
politicians today as it was when these laws were first introduced, so
that however much pressure employers might consider applying to
the legislatures, the latter can be expected to resist. It makes no
ethical or political sense for politicians to abandon this logic and
reduce the benefits paid to people who are injured as a result of
pure accidents or their own fault rather than insist that any
additional costs will be passed.on to consumers or all workers like
any other labour cost is.

63 See Ontario, Final Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers (Toronto:
King's Printer, 1913) at 5-6; R.C.B. Risk, 'This Nuisance of Litigation: The Origins of
Workers' Compensation in Ontario" in Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law
vol. 2 (Toronto: University Press, 1983) 418 at 458; T.G. Ison, The ForensicLottey (London:
Staples Press, 1967) at 35-36.
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Moreover, if that were not enough, there is a good deal of
empirical and analytical evidence available to suggest that dual
systems, which integrate both tort and no-fault principles of relief
are, on all of the relevant criteria, unambiguously superior to
systems, like our own, which make no-fault compensation the sole
basis of relief.64 In virtually every country which we recognize as
being free and democratic, as well as in many we would not,65
lawmakers have designed systems of providing relief to some victims
of accidents which integrate some principles of tort with a broader,
no-fault social insurance scheme. A verbatim transcript of such a
constitutional conversation would show that both empirical evidence
and logical analysis support the conclusion that dual systems of
accident compensation, incorporating both fault and no-fault
principles of relief, do operate smoothly and in a coordinated rather
than an internally conflicting way.
Nor is there anything in the history of this provision to
suggest the contrary. As an historical matter, this provision was
included in the first Workers' Compensation Act without much
discussion or debate. 66 For employers, the issue was not raised
frequently and when it was there was no attempt to justify it as a
necessary or vital ingredient of the scheme. For organized labour,
because the remedies in tort were of no assistance to the vast
majority of their members, the matter was hardly mentioned at all.
Contrary to popular belief, there was not an "historic trade off' of
relief in tort for compensation under the Act, because from labour's

64 Some of the analytical and empirical evidence that supports the position that no-fault
and fault based principles of accident compensation are compatible can be found in A.M.
Linden, "Faulty No-Fault: A Critique of the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on
Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation" (1975) 13 Osgoode Hall LJ. 449; (U.K.) Royal
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, Vol. 1 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1978); G.W.R. Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity (Wellington:
Oxford University Press, 1979) at 271-278. For a brief summary of how these two principles
are integrated in Western Europe, see Barth & Hunt, Workers Compensationand Work Related
Illnesses and Diseases (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981).
65 A.E.S. Tay, 'The Foundation of Tort Liability in a Socialist Legal System: Fault vs.
Social Insurance in Soviet Law" (1969) 19 U.T.LJ. 1.
66 R.C.B. Risk, supra, note 63. In his final report Chief Justice Meredith only mentions
the immunity discussions once and then only in response to the submissions of the Canadian
Manufacturers Association. See Ontario, supra, note 63 at 15.
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point of view they were not really giving up anything of any value
by accepting a rule that workers could no longer sue in tort.
Replacing an utterly inadequate system of relief in tort, Workers'
Compensation offered most workers financial compensation and
rehabilitative assistance for injuries they suffered in the course of
their employment for the very first time.
In the end then, a successful challenge to this statutory
prohibition against workers suing their employers in tort should
support the thesis of judicial review that I advanced at the outset.
By insisting on their rights under section 15 of the Charter, workers
would be able to take the benefit of all of the rules and principles
of corrective justice that are available to everyone else. This
example also shows that it is not just minorities who can make use
of constitutional conversations to enhance their participation in the
community's processes of government. The imperfections of the
political process are such that on occasion even majorities can be
treated unjustly by those they have elected (consented) to govern
them. Workers at the turn of the century, like women today, were
much less influential in the processes of politics than their numbers
and simplistic ideas of majority rule might suggest. By initiating a
conversation of justification in the courts, workers can remove a
section, in what otherwise is a constitutionally vital policy of accident
compensation, which never needed to have been included in the first
place and which was in fact recognized to be an injustice by the
person who is responsible for it being included in the original
67
scheme.
So, even in a case which seems quite controversial and
counterintuitive in the beginning, we find we have a third example
in which the potential of the judiciary, to enhance the possibility of

67 In the course of securing evidence prior to producing his report which led to the
enactment of the first Workers' Compensation Law in Ontario, and which provided a model
for everyone else, Chief Justice Meredith is reported to have said, with respect to the

immunity from tort provisions:
One of the justifications for this law is to get rid of the nuisance of litigation, and
I think even if injustice is done in a few cases it is better to have it done and have

swift justice meted out to the great body of men.
Workmens' Compensation Commission, Minutes of Evidence, (Toronto: King's Printer, 1913)
(Commissioner. W.R. Meredith) at 511-12.
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each person maintaining the maximum control over his or her
destiny that can be enjoyed equally by everyone else, is confirmed.
Through reasoned discourse, workers can demand that legislators
who are committed to respecting our constitutional values in the
laws they enact, repeal or reformulate this rule which unnecessarily,
and therefore unreasonably, limits their right to be treated as equals.
Through dispassionate dialogue, workers can explain to our
lawmakers that the inclusion of these sections in the original
Workers' Compensation schemes was not a matter which was
integral or central to their policy objectives and that today there is
no adequate reason to allow this compromise of the constitutionality
of our labour laws to endure any longer. It was a (relatively little
noticed and considered) political compromise, like other parts of the
recommended scheme,68 and it lacks the moral integrity necessary to
qualify as part of what we now consider to be a constitutional
labour code.
IV.

THE UNSKILLED,
ORGANIZED

THE

UNLUCKY,

AND

THE

We now have worked through three fairly straightforward
cases, currently being litigated, in which, constrained only by two
principles of constitutional interpretation, our third branch of
government can facilitate our liberal democratic tradition of political
organization. Agricultural workers, women, our youth, and even
workers as a class can initiate conversations with those who enacted
laws which unfairly burden them and, through a process of reasoned
dialogue, explain why such practices can no longer, if they could

As we have already noted, Workers Compensation laws across the country commonly
exclude disadvantaged groups from their benefit and protection. In explaining why he was not
recommending agricultural workers be included within his scheme, Chief Justice Meredith was
quite explicit about the "political" constraints under which he was operating. He wrote:
The principal industries excluded are the farming, wholesale and retail
establishments, and domestic service. There is, I admit, no logical reason why, if
any, all should not be included, but I greatly doubt whether the state of public
opinion is such as to justify such a comprehensive scheme....
Ontario, supra, note 63 at 9.
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ever, be justified. In these three relatively simple examples we can
see how, acting in the role of moral conscience or social critic the
courts can offer ethically powerful (though not, ultimately, legally
binding) opinions which can further our democratic ideal of each
person exercising the maximum control in the formulation of the
rules which govern his life.
While the three examples we have worked through are
important in confirming the theoretical possibility of integrating a
process of judicial review with our other democratic institutions and
processes of government, none of them are concerned with rules or
policies which could be said to be at the core of our labour code.
Though the reformulation of each of them would enhance the
democratic quality of our system of social relations somewhat, none
would result in a substantial alteration either in the shape or content
of our labour code or in a much greater opportunity for individuals
to participate in the processes of social cooperation of the society at
large.
In this section I want to follow, in more detail, the initial
stages of a conversation that I believe could have that effect. I
want to construct the first part of a dialogue about one of the most
central principles of our system of collective bargaining. 69 The
principle, known as "exclusivity," governs the way in which employee
interests are represented in our system of collective labour relations.
This central rule of our labour law is an important example because
it will give us an indication of just how significant an instrument of
social justice the Charter can be in ameliorating the condition of
those who are relatively less advantaged in our community.
The principle of exclusive representation stipulates that
whenever a majority of a group of workers, which is determined by
a government agency to be appropriate to associate together for
purposes of collective bargaining, chooses one union to represent
them in the decision-making processes of the enterprise, that union
becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for all of the workers in that
group. As a corollary of this principle it is unlawful for an employer
to negotiate with any other union or association or individual in the

69 The full dialogue is set out in D. Beatty, supra, note 3 at 135-79.
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group unless70 the union so "certified" consents to such
arrangements.
So described, it will not, I trust, be a matter of serious
debate that, prima facie at least, the principle of exclusive
representation does fundamental violence to a person's freedom to
associate only with those persons in the enterprise with whom he
chooses to join.71 In the first place, legislative adoption of a
principle of exclusive representation means that all workers who
want to participate in the formulation and administration of the
rules which will govern how they must pursue their occupational
objectives - including those who voted against and do not want to
belong to the union - must take out membership in the association
so certified. Because the principle makes the union chosen by the
majority of workers in the specified group the exclusive agent for all
dealings between employees and their employer, for a worker to be
able to participate in these processes of industrial government he
must join that particular union. He has, practically speaking, no
other choice. If the Teamsters are the union of choice of a majority
of the persons with whom you work, becoming a Teamster yourself
will be a condition precedent to all future involvement in settling
and applying the rules which govern your life while you are at
work. If a person insists on his freedom to remain outside that
organization he cannot, by definition, have any further involvement
in the decision-making processes which govern the workplace except
in trivial and peripheral ways (for example, casting a ballot where
a strike vote is held). Membership in the union (for example
Teamsters) chosen by the majority is made a condition precedent
to all further participation in the processes of industrial selfgovernment. Because exclusivity gives one union a monopoly on
access to the decision-making processes in the workplace, only if
70 The principle of exclusivity is an integral part of every collective bargaining statute
in Canada. In Ontario the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, s. 67(1) provides: "No
employer ...
shall ...
bargain with or enter a collective agreement with any other person or
another trade union ...
on behalf of ...
the employees in the bargaining unit."

71 This conception of freedom of association, the freedom to remain apart from
associations to which one does not want to belong (sometimes referred to as "negative
freedom') was not at issue in any of the cases dealing with the constitutional validity of laws
which limited the rights of workers to bargain, strike and engage in other forms of protected
activity. See Re Alberta Public Service Employee Regulations Act, supra, note 30.
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they are prepared to deny themselves the even more basic
entitlement of participating in the settlement and administration of
all the terms and conditions which govern their lives while at work
(viz. deny themselves the benefit and protection of the legislation),
can the equal freedom of these individuals to associate only with
those of their own choosing actually be preserved. To be able to
participate at all, as the legislation anticipates, many workers must
take out membership in a union they otherwise do not want to
join. If the parallel principle were applied to the decision-making
processes of our society at large, it would mean all opposition
members in a legislature would have to take out membership in the
governing party if they wished to have any further involvement in
the legislative and executive processes of government.
Another way to describe the constitutional defect which
renders the principle of exclusive representation null and void is to
point out that it violates a person's freedom of association in exactly
the same manner as an employer does when it insists, as a condition
of employment, that an individual sign a so-called "yellow-dog"
contract in which she agrees not to join any union.72 In both cases,
while the person or agency doing the coercing obviously differs,
employees are denied a freedom to control their own development
to the extent they are prevented from forming associations with
other workers of their own choosing to pursue their occupational
objectives. In both cases the workers are denied the (positive) right
to determine for themselves the associations through which they will
participate in the decision-making processes (both legislative and
adjudicative) which settle the rules which regulate their lives in the
places they work.
So described, it is not just the case that many individuals
will be required to join associations to which they do not want to
belong. Co-incidently, their (positive) freedom to form associations
with other workers who, for example, share a particular skill or trade

72 It is conventional wisdom of virtually all systems of collective labour relations that

such terms of employment cannot fairly be regarded as the product of the employee's true
consent. Even the most conservative interpretations of liberal political theory recognize that
holders of "private" power, like employers, can act coercively towards those to whom they offer
employment. See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Gateway Edition, 1960) at 13637.
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(for example law or nursing), or specific philosophy or world view
(for example social democrat or christian), or theory of dispute
resolution (for example strike or arbitration) for purposes of
participating in the decision-making process, will have been
drastically curtailed.
Because the principle of exclusive
representation requires the interest of every employee to be
represented through the union which has been certified as the sole
bargaining agent for the group as a whole, the very - indeed only
- reasons such employees would have to form associations with
those who have a common skill, philosophy etc. will have been
lost. Because any other association formed by these employees
could not perform the very (legislative, adjudicative) functions they
would want it to serve, the "freedom" to organize such groups is
73
made an utterly empty and meaningless one.
Now even if it is clear and straightforward that the principle
of exclusive representation interferes with and limits the freedom of
some employees, we know from our earlier examples that such a
conclusion cannot be determinative of the question of whether this
principle can pass constitutional scrutiny. As we have observed,
rights collide (here between those who want to bargain collectively
through a particular association/union and those who do not) and,
on such occasions, one or other or both of these competing rights,
of necessity, will have to give way. In the language of section one,
the difficult question is whether the principle of exclusive
representation is the kind of limitation on a person's freedom of
association which can be defended as a reasonable limit; one which
can be "demonstrably justified" in a society which considers itself
democratic and free.
It is to be expected that many of those institutions and
organizations which have a vested interest in the retention of the
present system and in particular in the principle of exclusive
representation will argue that it can. Their argument will be that
exclusivity is essential if the (positive) freedom (of association) of
those who want to bargain collectively is to be protected and made
secure. The claim will be that a principle like exclusivity is
The interpretation given by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re
Alberta Public Service Employee Regulations, supra, note 30, may preclude such a purposive

analysis of s. 2(d) of the Charter.
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necessary to ensure the workers and the labour movement are not
hopelessly and helplessly divided and, in the final analysis, to make
certain that working people remain sufficiently united that they can,
as a group, have some meaningful control over the kinds of lives
that they ultimately will lead. If the principle of exclusivity
compromises freedom of association, it will be said, it does so for
the greater good of workers as a whole, including those whose
freedom of association may be marginally compromised. As the
challenge to the immunity section of Workers' Compensation was
said to threaten the entire system of no fault relief, so the
prediction will be that without a principle of exclusive representation
our whole system of collective bargaining and the freedom of those
who choose to associate and bargain collectively would be seriously
threatened and subject to complete collapse. In pursuing such
purposes as these, it will be said, exclusivity is clearly consistent with
and indeed ultimately derived from the ideals which underlie our
constitutional regime.
Now in evaluating the response of those who favour the
retention of our current system of collective bargaining and the
principle of exclusivity on which it rests, it is not difficult to see how
the analysis we have been employing repeats itself. In the first
place, as with virtually every part of our labour code which we have
considered, it is apparent that the exclusivity principle can fairly
claim to be pursuing constitutionally valid ends. Reduced to its
essentials, the principle of exclusivity can be said to be one means
by which the solidarity principle, which is at the core of all systems
of collective labour relations, is secured.
In our own system of collective bargaining the solidarity
principle is manifested both in the principle of exclusivity and in the
rules used to designate which employees will be grouped together in
a unit appropriate for bargaining. In essence, the solidarity principle
is expressed both in the rules which define the boundaries of an
industrial community and in the exclusivity principle which specifies
how the wishes of the employees within that community will be
represented collectively. So described, it can, I think easily be
shown that even though the solidarity principle (and therefore all
systems of collective labour relations) itself restricts the freedom (of
association) of those who would rather bargain as individuals and
apart from their fellow employees, it (and therefore any collective

1989]

Shop Talk- The Constitutionality of Labour Law

429

bargaining system) does conform to our first principle of
constitutional review. Reduced to its essentials, solidarity protects
an equality in the opportunity to participate in the decision making
process between the interests of capital and labour as well as
between the interests of workers themselves.
First by promoting the equal liberty of those employees who
want to form associations with those with whom they work, the
principle of solidarity ensures many more individuals will be able to
participate more equally with their employer in settling the terms
and conditions on which they work. Solidarity ensures more workers
will have more control over the direction their lives will take.
Secondly, drawing on the exit-voice analysis developed by
Hirschman 74 and applied by Freeman and Medhoff75 it can also be
said, in support of any institution or process which incorporates the
solidarity principle, that it tends to equalize the extent to which each
worker can participate in the government of her working life by
making the preference of the average rather than the marginal
worker the effective criterion of decision. On both accounts
solidarity is a principle which is compatible with and supportive of
the ethic of equal personhood which is at the root of our
constitutional system of government. 76 Once again, as with all of
the other examples we have considered, the limitation that this
aspect of our labour code imposes on the fundamental freedoms of
some workers in our community can be derived from and justified
by the deepest values on which the constitution itself rests.
However, and for reasons which by now I trust are quite
familiar, it will not suffice for Canadian legislators to justify
encroachments on the fundamental freedoms and rights enshrined by
the Charter by pointing to the integrity of their objectives. As
constitutionally pure as the inspiration for such initiatives may be,

A. Hirschman, Eit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1970).
75 R.B. Freeman & J.L. Medhoff, 'qwo Faces of Unionism" (1979) Pub. Int. 69, and
R.B. Freeman & J.L. Medhoff, What Do Unions Do (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1984).

76 It might be noted that when the parallel question was posed in Ireland the Courts
held the solidarity principle was compatible with a constitutional commitment to freedom of

association by deciding that the latter does not entitle each worker to create his own
negotiating unit for himself. See InternationalEncyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial
Relations, Kluwar vol. 6 at 141.
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Canadian legislators must also establish that the (legislative) method
they have chosen to realize their objectives is itself appropriate that it meets the principle of reasonable alternative means. Thus,
again, if there were more than one way of accomplishing valid social
objectives - in this case worker solidarity, the elimination of "free
riders," industrial peace and stability, etc. - one of which invaded
our explicit constitutional rights less than others, that alternative
would have to be chosen by the legislature to accomplish these
purposes.
Once one accepts that our second, means-oriented principle
of "the reasonable alternative" will figure prominently in any future
analysis of the exclusivity principle, there can be little doubt that
what admittedly is one of the cornerstones of Canadian industrial
relations policy will be found to be constitutionally flawed. Quite
simply, alternate means, by which Canadian legislators could
accomplish the objectives that are common to all systems of
collective labour relations, abound. Specifically, there exists in
Western Europe today a large number of "free and democratic"
countries as diverse as Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
which have organized their systems of collective labour relations
around principles of employee representation which either respect,
without limitation, an individual's freedom to belong only to those
organizations he or she chooses to join or, and in all events, provide
77
a good deal more freedom than the exclusivity principle allows.
The existence and viable operation of these models of
industrial relations, organized around more liberal principles of
representing the collective interests of employees, presents a decisive
argument against any claim that the principle of exclusive
representation can be accepted as a reasonable limitation on a

Both academic writers and courts support the wisdom and propriety of turning to
the experience of other "free and democratic" societies which have already considered the
constitutionality of social policies, like the collective representation of employee interests,
against criteria similar to those which are set out in the Charter. See generally P.W. Hogg,
ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 619, where many of these
authorities are collected. It should be emphasized that in the vast majority of these countries
which have incorporated a more liberal principle of employee representation into their models
of industrial relations, there exists a strong constitutional (and/or statutory) commitment to
freedom of association which parallels s. 2(d) of our Charter.
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person's fundamental freedom of association in a society which
considers itself as being both free and democratic. These systems,
which are highly diverse in their detail and unique in their historical
origins, represent operational, alternate principles or means around
which the representation of employee interests in the decisionmaking processes at the workplace can be collectively organized in
a way which is more consistent with the constitutional commitments
we are bound now to respect. They are predicated on alternate
legal rules or institutions which actually guarantee an individual the
freedom of participating in the decision-making processes at the
workplace only through those organizations he or she chooses to
belong to or, at the very least, to guarantee considerably more
freedom than our existing system allows. As such, each of these
systems of collective labour relations represents a less drastic, viz.
more reasonable, alternative which is available to our legislators to
accomplish the objectives of industrial stability and worker solidarity
which are at the heart of all collective decision-making structures.
To paraphrase a familiar comment, if all of these societies can
manage without imposing any or much milder limitations on the
freedom of workers to join only those associations of their own
choosing, it is difficult to argue that a principle like exclusivity is
necessary in a free and democratic society such as our own.
Although in their details and in the historical circumstances
which gave rise to their development, each of the eight national
systems I have identified is unique, on closer examination it can be
seen that they actually fall into or, more properly, are organized
around, one of two broad principles of representing employee
interests in the decision-making processes of enterprises. According
to one principle, which governs the industrial relations systems in
Belgium, France, Ireland, and Switzerland, for example, and which
we might characterize as plural or multiple (as opposed to exclusive)
representation, in order to be able to fully participate in the various
decision-making processes of the workplace a worker must join a
union, but he or she is given a choice as to which of several
competing unions he or she may become a member of.
On this principle, which has had a long history in European
labour relations at the levels of national and industry-wide
bargaining, it is true that those who are opposed to joining any
trade union as a condition of participating in the decision-making
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processes of the enterprise, as well as those who claim membership
in smaller, independent, "less representative" unions, are not able to
enjoy the same (equal) degree of freedom (of association) as those
who are committed to trade unions which are more in the
mainstream - unless, of course, they are prepared to compromise or
abandon their beliefs. Nevertheless and while acknowledging that
this principle of employee representation does not allow for a full
or absolute freedom of association for all workers it is apparent that,
to the extent it offers workers a wide variety of choice in the
organizations to which they must, as a practical matter, belong, it
infringes a person's freedom of association much less drastically than
our own principle of exclusive or monopolistic representation and so
would be constitutionally preferred. 78
In terms of the collective decision-making processes and
institutions we employ to govern our societies at large, the industrial
relations systems in operation at the level of the enterprise in these
countries parallel closely and compare favourably with our institutions of representative, parliamentary democracy. By contrast, the
principle of exclusivity could be said to mirror, in one important
respect at least, the one-party state. 79 In the former, even if a

78 In Belgium, for example, where this system seems most highly developed, typically a
worker would have a choice between five different trade union groups, while in Switzerland,
where there is no governmental restriction on which unions are entitled to participate in these
decision-making processes, the choice would be practically unlimited.
79 Though the analogy is, I believe, close and informative, I do not intend to claim that

it is exact. In the first place, unions obviously do not have the same sovereign authority in
the rule-making processes of the workplace that a governing party does in the legislative
processes of the state. However, it is also true and widely recognized that a union which is

granted the exclusive authority to represent the interests of all workers in an enterprise (or
some segment thereof) is in fact and in law "clothed with a power not unlike that of a

legislature [in] its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those
for whom it legislates." Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. et aL, 323 U.S. 192
(1944) at 202. See also the concurring judgment of Mr. Justice Powell in Abood et al. v.
Detroit Board of Education et al, 431 US 209 (1976) at 244ff, where the analogy between
trade unions and political parties in a legislative, decision-making process is developed further.

The same parallel is also discussed in R. Weyand, "Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining"
(1985) 45 Col. L. Rev. 556 and G. Schatzki, "Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation and the
Interests of Individual Workers:.Should Exclusivity be Abolished?" (1975) 123 U. Penn. L.

Rev. 897.

For a similar analysis of the West German model, see R. Richardi, "Worker

Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Federal Republic of Germany" 5 (1982)

Comp. Lab. L.23.
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worker is not a member of the (governing) organization or
association (whether a party or union) which commands the support
of the majority of the community (whether social or industrial), he
or she is able to remain a member of his or her own ("most
representative") organization or association, and no other, and
continue to participate fully in the processes and institutions of
decision-making. By contrast, in a community - be it political or
economic - which vests exclusive and absolute control over the
decision-making process in one association - whether party or union
- which enjoys the support of a majority of persons in the relevant
unit, membership in that organization becomes a condition precedent
to all forms of participation and possibilities of self-government.
To some, the analogy between the principle of exclusive
representation and participation in the wider political processes
which govern our society at large may not have been drawn with
sufficient care. It might be argued that the impairment of a
person's freedom of association that is caused by the principle of
exclusive representation is more properly compared to that of the
citizen in a general election who casts a losing vote in the
constituency in which he or she lives. But a moment's reflection
shows why the suggested parallel is itself wide of the mark. In
analyzing how individual workers participate in a system of collective
labour relations, our concern is with a person's involvement in the
institutions of industrial self-government after and not simply when
they cast their votes. Exclusive representation is a rule which
regulates participation by employees in the legislative and
adjudicative processes through which laws are enacted for and
applied to the workplace. In the democratic, parliamentary
processes we use to control our social relations in the community at
large, while it is obviously true that not everyone casts a "winning
vote," it is also the fact that persons whose preferences and politics
are different from the majority of their neighbours are not
A second difference between the position of an exclusive bargaining representative

in our "private" system of industrial government and the ruling organization in a one-party
state is, of course, the provision in law in the former but not the latter of the governing
association being replaced by a competing organization. However, when one contemplates the

enduring security of major unions such as the Autoworkers, Steelworkers, Postal Workers, and
Teamsters in the major units in which they hold bargaining rights, this difference is in practice
only one of degree and one which could easily be exaggerated.
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compelled to join the party of the successful candidate in order to
continue their participation in the processes of government. The
process itself retains its pluralistic character. By contrast, in the
legislative and adjudicative institutions we currently use to govern
social relations in the workplace, only one party is permitted to
participate by law (of exclusive representation). No one who voted
against and who belongs to a union (party) other than that which
secured majority support will be allowed to participate in the
decision making processes unless and until he or she joins the union
to which the state has granted a monopoly in the representation of
everyone's interest in the enterprise.
As solicitous of the freedom of workers to join only those
associations of their own choosing as the principle of plural
representation may be, the second principle of employee representation around which the other European communities I have
identified have organized their systems of collective labour relations
(and in particular Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy
and the Netherlands) is even more congenial to this political and
ethical ideal. This principle, which we might characterize as purely
voluntary or consensual representation, ensures that every worker in
an enterprise is entitled to vote for, be represented on and/or
elected to the institution through which the interests of workers
must be expressed to those who employ or consume their
services. In the systems of collective labour relations in these
countries, freedom of association is guaranteed equally to those
individuals who do not want to join any association (to remain
and/or run as independents as it were) as well as to those whose
religious or political or nationalist views incline them to join unions
which do not attract sufficient support in the community at large to
be designated as "most representative" by the relevant government
authorities. Every individual whether or not he or she belongs to
the association which commands the support of a majority of
employees in the plant, or indeed to any association at all, is
entitled to participate as an equal in the election and operation of
the institutions through which employees are integrated collectively
into the decision-making processes of the firm.
In drawing attention to the existence of this large group of
European communities which have organized their systems of
collective labour relations around one of these two distinct principles
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of representing employees' interests in the decision-making processes
which govern the places where they work, it is not my intention to
review all or indeed any of them in any detail. For the purposes of
the present analysis it is sufficient - indeed to be consistent with its
whole tenor and approach it is necessary - to limit our focus, at
least initially, to the model which represents the "least drastic" means
of accomplishing the objectives legislators pursue in developing a
system of collective labour relations. For purposes of drawing out
the policy implications and the pragmatic possibilities of the present
analysis, it is appropriate to focus our attention, at this stage, to the
model which seems most faithful to the ideals we have entrenched
in the Charter and simply to note the existence of the wide diversity
of alternate principles and legal institutions through which these
ethical standards might also be expressed.
Of the various legal regimes that I have identified, there
would seem little doubt that the West German system of
representing employee interests in the collective decision-making
processes at the places they work is the model which would be most
easily integrated with and sympathetic to our new constitutional
environment. Of the various systems which incorporate the more
liberal principle of voluntary representation, the German system is
the one most fully developed. It is the one with which we have the
most experience, and it has, as well, received the most extensive
academic scrutiny by far. And, compared to the systems of plural or
multiple representation, it not only carries the principle of freedom
of association further, especially for those who do not want to join
any association, but it does so in a way which is entirely consistent
with the ethic of solidarity which is so integral to our own model of
collective bargaining.
The basic structure of the West German system is now quite
familiar.8 0 The cornerstone on which the principle of purely
consensual representation has been erected is the works
council. Like a union which has been certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent for a group of employees, the territorial authority
- the sovereignty - of a works council extends to all employees

80

A good summary of the German model is contained in M. Pelzer, The German Labour

Management Relations Act (London: MacDonald and Evans Ltd, 1972).
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within its jurisdiction. Unlike the system in North America,
however, the scope of its jurisdiction within an enterprise is
comprehensive and, at a minimum, will cover all employees in an
enterprise including both blue collar and white collar employees and
certain strata of middle management as well.81 Indeed, the works
council envisages that proper representation of the different skills,
occupations, sections and even sexes within the plant will also be
secured.
Like the rules which govern the selection of an exclusive
bargaining agent in Canada, essentially all persons who will be
governed by the decision of the works council are entitled to vote
for its members. Everyone over the age of 18 who has been
employed for six months is entitled to vote. 2 However, again in
contrast with our own system, the guarantee of a worker's freedom
of association goes well beyond the opportunity to cast a losing
ballot. Thus, all workers, regardless of their union affiliation, are
able to propose or stand as candidates for the council and, if
elected, participate directly in its affairs. In the German model,
members are elected as representatives for different sectors of the
enterprise for a three-year term during which, except in extreme
cases, they cannot be recalled.8 3 Unless otherwise provided, the
statute requires the works council and the employer to meet at least
once a month to deal with all matters related to the operation of
the enterprise.

81 The distinction between and segregation of blue-collar and white-collar workers into
separate decision-making processes, with separate representation is, by contrast, in Canada,
one of the most durable and respected shibboleths. See Labour Relations Law in Canada:

Casebook, supra, note 32. For a discussion of the feasibility of incorporating interest group
representation in the North American model of collective bargaining, see E. Silverstein, "Union

Decision on Collective Bargaining Goals: A Proposal for Interest Group Participation" (1985)
77 Mich. L Rev. 1485 and B. Adell, "Establishing a Collective Employee Voice in the

Workplace: How can the Obstacles be Lowered" in G. England, Essays in Labour Relations
Law (Montreal: C.C.H. Canadian Ltd, 1986) at 3-24.
82 In virtue of the fact that some employees may be under the age of eighteen when
they first begin to work, special provision for the representation of youth workers is included
in the Works ConstitutionAct. See M. Pelzer, supra, note 80.
83 For a brief discussion on the circumstances in which the tenure of a member of a

works council can be terminated prematurely - which essentially pertains to situations of
unlawful behaviour - see M. Pelzer, ibid. at 55-59.
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Even from such a skeletal description of the institutional
structures through which the principle of voluntary representation is
expressed, it is quite apparent how much more the West German
model of works councils respects the freedom of those who either
do not want to join any union, or want to join one different from
that to which a majority of their colleagues want to belong, than our
own system of collective bargaining does. Instead of the right to
participate in the legislative and adjudicative processes of industrial
government being conditioned on membership in the union
(association, party) preferred by the majority of employees, each
worker would be able to participate through the organization or
representative of his or her choice. Of that constitutional advantage
there can be no doubt.
In fact, by focusing our attention on the structures and
institutions of the West German model of representing employee
interests in the decision-making processes of an enterprise, one can
see that this is not the only constitutional advantage that this
particular system of collective labour relations enjoys. As well, and
in large part precisely because this model is so solicitous of a
workers' freedom of association, it turns out to be the case that it
is able to extend the benefit and protection of this body of law more
evenly, that is more equally, to all of the people who work in that
community. Through this model of collective labour relations the
state is able to create a legal environment which applies - or more
properly is available - to individuals in the society more equally than
our own. Indeed as a practical matter, all of the various models of
collective labour relations operating in the countries I have
identified are generally utilized by a significantly larger percentage
of the workforce than our own. Again if, for purposes of
illustration, we focus on the West German experience, on the basis
of the available evidence it would appear that the percentage of
workers governed by and benefiting from their system of collective
labour relations is almost double our own. Such a staggering
discrepancy in the inequality of treatment that is tolerated by these
two competing systems of legal regulation provides a second and
equally powerful reason why a system of labour relations modelled
on the principles which distinguish the West German method should
be constitutionally preferred.
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The best evidence of our own circumstances suggests that
our system of collective bargaining directly benefits and offers
protection to between 35 and 40 percent of our workforce. At the
most optimistic, the figure is 45 percent.8 4 The fact is that the
greater majority of Canadians, many of whom are among the least
well off in our community, simply have not received any direct
benefit from or been protected by this method of involving
employees in the decision-making processes in the places they
work. Indeed if one were to exclude the public sector and focus
exclusively on individuals working for "private" enterprises, the extent
to which our model of collective bargaining could be said to
enhance the lives of workers in Canada would be even lower
still. By contrast, in Germany over 80 percent of the workforce
benefits from being able to participate directly in the decisionmaking processes which govern their lives in the places they work.6 5
The substantial difference in how far these alternate
principles and institutions of collective labour relations are able to
reach down to those workers who are least able to claim a
meaningful measure of involvement in the systems of decision
making which order their lives when they work, allows us to return
to the theme which has motivated this essay from the
beginning. The very different coverage thege two methods of
representing employees' interests are able to effect reveals most
clearly how dramatically the Charter and the process of judicial
review can enhance the cause of social justice for the great majority
of workers in our country. If the Courts put the Charter to work
according to the principles we have been using, and our system of
collective labour relations were made to conform more closely to the
principles of employee representation which underlie the European
models I have identified, the prospect of extending processes of
democratic self government to those workers our own model has
never been able to adequately serve would be one we could
contemplate seriously. Institutions of industrial democracy could
84 See RJ. Adams, 'The Extent of Collective Bargaining in Canada" (1984) 39 Relations
Industrielles 65.

85 See C.W. Summers, "Worker Participation in the U.S. & West Germany: A
Comparative Study from an American Perspective" (1980) 28 Am. J.of Comp. Law 367 at
377.
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finally be made available to protect and for the benefit of the least
privileged workers in our midst as well as those whose personal and
material resources ensure them a measure of participation even in
our less liberal and more unequal processes of industrial selfgovernment.
In focusing on such distinctions between these alternate
methods of reconciling the competing interests which are at play in
all labour relationships, it is important to emphasize that such
differences in coverage can not simply or even largely be attributed
to the fact that the West German system in particular and the
European models in general offer large numbers of people the
choice to remain free from involvement with unions. Although it is
true that systems, like the West German model, which are based on
a principle of purely voluntary representation, will obviously be more
attractive to individuals for whom all unions are an anathema, in the
West German experience the non-union group is very much in the
minority.
In fact, and almost paradoxically, the much broader reach of
these European systems seems to follow directly from the more
limited, less intrusive, scope of their organizing principles. Because
an institution like the West German works council does not, as the
principle of exclusivity effectively does, oblige a person to join a
union against his or her will, the legislative framework can,
consistently with principles of liberalism (freedom) and democracy,
require that it be established as a matter of right at the initiative of
a tiny fraction of the workforce. Thus, in West Germany, the Works
Constitution Act provides that, on the petition of three or more
workers in an enterprise, or of a union which is so represented
within the staff, the electoral process by which a works council is
established can be set in motion.
Precisely because this model is predicated on a principle of
representation which respects the freedom of workers not to join
associations to which they do not want to belong, it can be
presented and justified as legislation which creates a decision-making
structure which promotes an equality between employees in their
opportunity to participate in the formulation of the rules which
regulate their working lives. The works council system represents a
method of industrial self-government through which the position of
a worker in an enterprise is shaped in accordance with the basic
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values and principles of a free and democratic society. In an
important sense, the governing legislation in West Germany can be
understood as a kind of employment standard establishing a minimal
structure of proceduraldueprocess in the decision-making institutions
of an enterprise. It is precisely because their principles of
representing employee interests so closely conform to our policies
of pluralism, rather than (like exclusivity) being a variant of the
monopolistic or one party state, that legislative provisions of this
kind can be enacted to facilitate, if not require, its application in
virtually every location in which people work.
Because it can be drafted in such a way as to make it more
accessible to individuals regardless of the sector or corner of the
labour market in which they work, it follows that in addition to (and
largely because of) securing greater freedom (of association) in the
places people work, works councils, at least of the West German
kind, are also more in keeping with the commitment, in section 15
of the Canadian Charter,to formulate laws which impact directly on
each person's opportunity for personal autonomy and self control as
equally as they possible can. Indeed, in addition to its more
extensive coverage, from the skeletal outline of its structure, we can
see there is a second dimension to the West German model which
promotes our constitutional commitment to justice and equality far
more than the system we currently employ. Thus, in addition to the
principle of employee representation which it uses, the West
German model defines the group of employees that must act
collectively in a way which advances the ethic of solidarity and the
concept of equal personhood much more than the parallel rules we
use to determine what units are appropriate for bargaining. When
it is set against the West German model of voluntary representation
a vote for a system based on the principle of exclusive
representation is a needless restriction on freedom and compromise
of equality.
In the result, all of the European systems and in particular
the West German model entail more freedom (of association) and
greater equality (in participation) than our existing system can ever
hope to achieve. The ideals of freedom and democracy, of decisions
by consent and consensus, are extended beyond the political
institutions which govern their society at large to the vast majority
of the economic enterprises in which people actually spend the
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majority of their waking lives. On the test I have said will form an
important principle of interpretation for the Canadian Charter the
conclusion follows naturally and unavoidably that such a method of
industrial organization must be constitutionally preferred. In the
language of section 1 of the Charter, the viable existence and
demonstrated vitality of a system of collective representation of the
interests of workers like the West German works council means that
the limitations which are imposed on workers' freedoms and the
inequalities which are tolerated by the representation principle of
exclusivity can no longer be "demonstrably justified" in a society
which claims title to freedom
and democracy as the governing
86
criteria of its social relations.
On the thesis we have been testing throughout this analysis,
the methods and institutions of collective labour relations in West
Germany in particular, and the communities of western Europe in
general, offer the most powerful evidence of how, properly
interpreted, the Chartercan work as an instrument of social justice
for those, in the unorganized, "secondary," sectors of our labour
markets, who suffer most from a lack of equity in and control over
their lives when they work. This example illustrates very powerfully
how a group of (largely unskilled, unorganized) workers who
traditionally have had very little influence in the formulation of the
rules which make up our labour code, can secure a measure of
social justice through a principled process of decision making in a
way they never have been able in the political and legislative arena
where their lack of resources - both material and personal - are

allowed to count against them.8 7 Their example confirms that
groups such as these may have a comparative advantage in the
branch of government where the force of one's principle, not the
power of one's resources, determines the quality of participation in
the processes of law making.

86 1 should acknowledge that there are a second set of arguments, which question the

transplantability of rules of foreign or comparative law. I have canvassed what I believe to
be the most important of these in D. Beatty, supra, note 3 at 156-79.
87 Just how poorly represented workers in the secondary, unorganized labour markets
really are can be sensed by the posture of organized labour groups who, at various points in
the evolution of our labour laws, have endeavoured to resist the introduction of employment
standards pertaining to minimum wages and unjust dismissal.
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V. CONCLUSION
Rather than summarize the thrust of the argument I have
developed in the preceding parts I want, in this concluding section,
to locate my hypothesis about the role of the Courts and judicial
review in a larger historical context. Earlier in this essay I drew a
distinction between the moral and legal authority of the courts in
exercising their powers of constitutional review.88 Because section
33 of the Charter gives the legislature the final say on whether it
will respect most of the substantive rights and freedoms the Charter
guarantees, the courts' role is ultimately only an advisory one. If a
legislature chooses to do so, it can'ignore the ethical imperatives the
court identifies in our system of social relations. The practical effect
of any constitutional conversation ultimately depends on the
willingness of the legislature to accept the conclusions the court
draws from the dialogue it supervises. The potential of our third
branch of government, to enhance the democratic quality of our
system of government, depends directly on the force of its reasoning
and on its ability to encourage a symbiotic and supportive
relationship with the other two branches of government.
If such an attitude were to be embraced in the cases we
have reviewed, it can, I think, fairly be said that the kinds of
alternative laws and rules that we have identified, which would have
to be adopted to bring our labour code in line with the dictates of
the Charter, would be in keeping with a gradual but pronounced
evolution which distinguishes the development of our labour laws
over the course of the last six hundred years.8 9 Now at this stage
of the essay, it is not my intention to review all of the major rules
and regulations which have characterized the various labour codes
our ancestors have enacted in the past. Suffice it to say that over
the course of the past six centuries, one can discern a constant and
significant, though not always conscious, liberalization and
democratization in the law of work relations which, on the
interpretation we have been following, the Charter will substantially

88 Supra, note 7.

89 A brief synopsis of this evolution is set out in D. Beatty, supra, note 3 at 21-46.
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further. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the laws regulating
labour relationships were drawn decidedly in favour of the
consumers and employers of labour rather than in the interests of
the workers. Duties not rights, status not freedom, were the
hallmarks of the pre-industrial rules used to regulate labour
relations. Compulsory labour, maximum wages, minimum hours,
apprenticeship rules, settlement laws, and criminal sanctions imposed
on workers who dared to exercise their freedom to associate with
their fellow workers or leave their employment were the principle
90
features of the labour code of that day.
With the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, and as the
implication of moving to a completely unregulated market for labour
became (appallingly) clear, a shift in the focus of the legal code
gradually evolved. Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century
legislative initiatives were enacted to relieve the most glaring
injustices which scarred the social landscape. Acting by-and-large
pragmatically, and on an "ad hoc" basis, 91 Parliament responded to
circumstances of exceptional need, initially for children and then for
women, first in the cotton mills and gradually extending their reach
to other sectors of the economy. Throughout this period, the
practice of Parliament was to act incrementally both in the scope of
the protection that was afforded - which related initially to hours
of work, periods of rest, education, sanitation, hygiene, accident
prevention - as well as with respect to the freedom of workers to
associate for their mutual aid and protection, and in the groups of
workers who would benefit thereby.
Since the turn of the century, of course, both the nature
and focus of social regulation have shifted again. Broadly speaking,
the laws, which we have come to rely on to regulate and co-ordinate
90 The outlines of the labour codes of pre industrial English society are set out in W.S.
Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol. 2 (London: Methuen, 1932) at 459-64 and vol. 4
(London: Methuen, 1932) at 340-54, 379-89. For a brief summary, see E. Dodd, "From
Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of Regulation of Employment Contracts"
(1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 643.
91 All of the standard accounts of the development of factory legislation underscore this
characteristic nature of its evolution. See B.L. Hutchins & A. Harrison, A History of Factory
Legislation, 3d ed. (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1966). 0. Kahn-Freund describes the evolution
of this body of law as "trial and error" in Labour and the Law (London: Stevens & Sons,
1972) at 37.
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work activities in our community can be understood as extending
additional forms of protection for workers against arbitrary and
abusive assertions of authority. They aim to regulate how some
individuals in our community are able to control others. One strand
of our labour law continues the tradition of the early factory
legislation. It guarantees, essentially on the same grounds of public
health and morality, an expanding set of entitlements pertaining to
the physical, economic and occupational security of the person. This
is the method of our Employment Standards and Human Rights
Legislation. In these modern variations our society now insists that
workers be provided with those other terms and conditions of work
which we have come to realize as being equally essential to a
person's maintaining control over the direction and details of his or
her life. We have continued the gradual evolution and have moved
from protecting the most basic concerns of the worker for his or
her physical safety and survival in the original factory legislation, to
enacting a set of rules which accommodates the more human
aspirations more and more people look for in their work.
In addition to establishing a set of minimum, substantive
conditions of employment, our legislatures have employed a second
means to permit workers to protect their own interests and purposes
more effectively in the "private" processes of law-making where the
detailed rules which govern their (working) lives are settled. Rather
than relying exclusively on legislative prescriptions to constrain
market outcomes, early on our legislators turned to procedural
devices through which those who were weakest and most vulnerable
to the competitive forces of the market could themselves join
together so as to be able to better protect and realize their personal
ambitions and purposes in their work.
It is in this tradition of making procedural adjustments to
the market model of regulating work that our contemporary
collective bargaining laws belong. Collective bargaining statutes, as
well as the more recent federal and provincial initiatives in
establishing health and safety and redundancy committees, are
designed, inter alia, to overcome additional social impediments,
which can interfere with workers' opportunities to join together, so
that they can participate more effectively in the decision-making
processes of the workplace. Freedom of association requires, and
collective bargaining legislation seeks to provide, active state
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encouragement and support to counteract the obstacles which the
market and the "private" institutions and organizations of production
can themselves create. Collective bargaining legislation is an attempt
to ensure that the power of "private!' property (the threat
advantage), which may otherwise be used in making decisions in the
market, cannot be invoked to frustrate or defeat workers' initiatives
to form their own associations as a means of creating some measure
of countervailing power.
Taken as a whole, the legal regime by which our own society
regulates the performance of work can best be understood as endeavouring to provide fair processes of decision-making through which
the competing interests of workers and those who purchase their
services can be reconciled. Essentially the market model which
emerged with the development of industrial society has been
adapted so that the balance that is effected is more sensitive to the
needs and the purposes people pursue in their work. On the one
hand, setting minimum standards of safety, security and physical wellbeing provides a check on the tyranny which, as we have seen, is
the potential of this (as indeed any) decision-making process. On
the other, insisting that everyone in the community respects the
freedom of workers to associate with whomever they choose ensures
that the latter will possess a sufficient measure of countervailing
power to enable them to have a more meaningful input in the final
balance that is struck. Modern labour legislation, taken as a whole,
endeavours to require that all sources of power and influence be
used in a way which respects the equal entitlement of everyone to
the conditions which are necessary to control or at least be
meaningfully involved in the decisions which determine how they
will live out their lives.
Characterizing our own legal model of work regulation as an
attempt to invoke fair processes to reconcile our differences as
employers, consumers and workers offers another perspective 92 on
why, notwithstanding the emphasis in recent times on the legislative
instrument, our society is still very much within and furthering what
Henry Maine characterized as the "progressive tradition." Our own

92 See 0. Kahn-Freund, "A Note on Status and Contract in British Labour Law" (1967)
30 Mod. L. Rev. 235.
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contribution to the chronology of work regulation continues the
movement away from status and towards consent as the organizing
principle which governs the regulation of work relations. All of the
labour legislation enacted since the turn of the century can be seen
as instances of social control over how some (employers and
consumers) in our community exercise authority over others
(workers). As each of the examples we have considered confirms,
rather than serving some utilitarian purpose such as freedom to
trade or the well-being of the community in the aggregate, individual
autonomy and self-government has become an even deeper purpose
to which virtually all social regulation of work relationships is now
dedicated.
Set within that historical evolution in the laws we have
erected to house our labour relationships, it can now be seen how,
on the interpretation we have been following, the courts' role can
fairly be described as encouraging our legislators to extend this
development its next natural and logical step. Especially in the last
example we considered, we can see how a principle of voluntary and
plural representation of employee interests would result in consent
playing an even more meaningful role in the determination of the
rules which govern each individual's working life than our present
system allows. In the same way the principle of exclusivity was an
improvement on the policies which preceded it (from the monopoly
of the guilds to the laissez faire rules of criminal and civil
conspiracy), the entrenchment of the Charter should result in even
more sophisticated and sensitive rules of employee participation
being introduced into the processes in which decisions are made
about people's lives at the places they work. On the two principles
we have employed, constitutional litigation and judicial review should
allow us to move closer to the ideal of industrial self-government
towards which the lessons of history seem gradually to have been
directing us. On the interpretation I have proposed the
entrenchment of the Charterand the revitalization of the process of
judicial review will allow those individuals, who traditionally have
had little involvement in setting the rules which order their lives, to
secure a measure of participation and control in the rule-making
processes at their workplaces, which, under the existing legal regime,
is available only to the most privileged workers in our community.
If a legislature were to take seriously the idea of bringing its labour
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laws into line with the rights and freedoms the Charter guarantees,
in the ways we have considered in this essay, Canada could more
honestly project an image of itself as a society in which the inner
logic of freedom and democracy permeates all of the social relations
in which its members were involved, and our courts could fairly
claim an important part of the credit for that accomplishment.

